Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 460

Book Reference: Page 460

Author’s Views: Narrating the events leading to the appointment of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan, the author says that on 4th July 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan, conveyed, in a letter to Mountbatten ‘formally to recommend to the king the appointment of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the governor-general of Pakistan. He also, in that letter expressed the hope that Mountbatten would remain as Governor-general of India. The reader is urged to go through the analysis of the author in the succeeding paras in pages 461 –463.

Comments: Probably it  was neither megalomania on his part nor having a constitutional head placed in an impossible situation, the reason for Mr. Jinnah to assume the appointment of Governor General of Pakistan (rather than conceding it to Mountbatten immediately on getting independence). As the subsequent events would show, it appears to have been a calculated master strategic stroke . Kashmir, the Princely State, the third letter in the acronym of “Pakistan” has not decided to join them. The Maharaja of J and K was thinking of making it a neutral country in the lines of Switzerland. It was also feared that there was a possibility that he might accede to India, as J&K was geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan.

By August 1947 (and even earlier) India was already grappling with the influx of refugees, food shortages and  lack of most of the essential services. The Armed forces were getting reorganized. This was the most opportune time  to invade Kashmir by proxy backed by regular forces. The planning and preparation for that probably had already been finalized in their drawing boards. It commenced in October 1947 barely within two months of Jinnah assuming office of the Governor General. Had Mountbatten taken over as the Governor General of Pakistan, in his capacity of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he would have got wind of it and could not have permitted employment of regular forces to take part in the invasion of Kashmir.
He might have even sounded India in advance. (He remained in India till June 1948). Lt.Gen. Sinha , in an article in Deccan Chronicle narrates the events leading to the dismissal of Sir. Robert. Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart, who took over as Army Chief of India on 15 august 1947, "was informed by his British counterpart in Pakistan of the preperations  being made for the invasion of Kashmir . He failed to apprise the Government nor did he take any action in the matter. Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 cought us totally unprepared. The Indian Army miraculously managed to retrieve the situation."
It was probably this fore planning  which is the more likely reason for getting rid of Mountbatten from Pakistan on their getting independence. If there was any cunning plan that was this (cf Page 455). As far as the knowledge of the commentator, this reasoning for assuming the of the appointment of Governor General of Pakistan on its independence by Mr. Jinnah has not been recorded anywhere. As the learned author puts it (Page 525) “ Only the Supreme God knows all.”

I conclude my post  and this blog with the following simple comment on the book . While Mahatma Gandhi changed the course of the history of India, Shri. Jaswant Singh through his book has changed  its history itself!"

Commentator's Note : I reiterate what I said in the first post of this blog "I hold Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah in high esteem. He was undoubtedly one of the greatest leader of the sub-continent of the century. His championing the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity as lauded by Gopal Krishna Gokhale needs no further elaboration. He was a great orator and an incisive analyst of political and social realities. His obduracy was matching and even excelled that of Gandhi's. While Gandhi would relent ultimately to the 'inevitable', what Jinnah said and believed in were inevitable. In my comments whereever I have referred Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah as Jinnah , they have to be assumed as having the full adjectives and honour he commands. He is referred as "Jinnah" only because of the sources from where the context is taken refer him as such. No disrespect is meant by the commentator.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 454-455

Book Reference: Page 454-455

Author’s Views: Narrating the proceedings of the AICC meeting on 14-15 June 1947, quoting Lohia the author says that Gandhi wanted the Congress party to honour the commitments made by its leaders namely Nehru and Patel. He wanted the Congress to accept the principle of partition and having done that should make a declaration regarding its execution. Once the Congress and the Muslim League had signified the acceptance of partition, the British Government and the Viceroy should be told to step aside and the partitioning of the country should be carried out jointly by the Congress and the Muslim League with no intervention from a third party.

The author concludes that though so much has been said about Gandhi, the saint was at the same time a tactician; the above fine and cunning proposal as per author’s knowledge has not been put on record.

Comments: The adjective ‘Fine’ for Gandhi’s advice to the Congress Leaders is very apt but ‘Cunning’ - against whom? From the time of the First RTC (and even before that) Gandhi had times with out number in his speeches, writings, in conferences had driven only this point, ie. “ Leave us alone and get out, we will solve our problems and differences ourselves.” He was even prepared to accept if the nation was embroiled by anarchy and blood shed. But this appeal of his found favour neither with the British nor with the Muslim League. There is nothing cunning in his proposal. He always felt that if two brothers of the family fight and go their separate ways they would still continue to be brothers and there should be no need for a third party to poke its nose. But this approach of Gandhi was never ever agreed to by the Muslim League. They felt the British, who have enslaved the country and exploited its resources for the last 200 years would be more dependable than their own fellow countrymen.

To quote from Gandhi’s speech on 8th August 1942: “ many friends have come and asked me to agree to it (Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan) for the time being to placate Mr. Jinnah, disarm his suspicions and to see how he reacts to it. But I cannot be party to a course of action with a false promise. At any rate, it is not my method…” To impute that Gandhi had cunning proposal is a gross injustice.

The more logical reasoning for acceptance of the proposal was given by Nehru (Page 457): “Even if we get freedom for India (undivided), with that background, it would be very weak India; that is a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls. And also the fact that we saw no other way of getting our freedom – in the near future, I mean.” It is a historical fact that right from the time of the Romans and Greeks and then the Mouryas and later the Moguls, leaving the powers to federated units and having a weak central leadership invariably resulted in the disintegration of their respective empires. History would have by now repeated itself and the balkanization of the sub-continent would have become a reality. Nehru further said “ if others do not want to be in it, how can we and why should we force them to be in it?” Another important reason was the wanton killings that were going on in Punjab, which Nehru wanted to bring to an early end.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 451

Book Reference: Page 451 para 3

Author’s Views: Narrating the Congress Partition Plan the author quotes from BR Nanda’s essay on “ Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the partition of India 1935-47”, that Nehru and Patel agreed for partition of India because they were power hungry. The acceptance of Partition by the Congress had started after the Muslim League’s Pakistan Resolution in their Lahore Session itself. The author quotes Gandhi’s writing of April 1940 “ The Muslims must have the same right to self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division”. The author further states that the Congress Working Committee resolution two years later expressed the same sentiment.  He states that, in 1944 Gandhi not only conceded the principle of partition but also discussed the modalities with Jinnah. He further adds to the effect that the very acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan by the Congress indicated their willingness for partition.

The author concludes that the Congress “engineered” the partition of India in this manner.

Comments: The author’s conclusion, to say the least is ridiculous. The moment the masses came to know of the impending division of the Country, there were wide spread arson, pillages and the like to dislocate and drive away the innocent public. Delaying further the declaration of independence would have only escalated the misery. At least, immediately after the declaration, the respective Governments could try and control the wanton destruction on both sides. That is why Nehru and Patel hastened to agree for the Partition. We have already seen that the British were determined to carve out Pakistan (Appendix xi).

The Muslim League session was held in Lahore at the end of March 1940. The text of Pakistan resolution   " Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or be acceptable to the Musalmans unless it is designed on the following basic principles namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions, which should be so constituted with such-territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent states’ , in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”
It is left to the reader to deduce as to who did the so-called “engineering” of the partition.

The author very cleverly quotes Mahatma Gandhi out of context to prove his point. After the Lahore Resolution of the League of March 1940,Gandhi wrote  an article entitled “A Baffling Situation”, (Excerpts)  "A question has been put to me; Do you intend to start general civil obedience although Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah has declared war against Hindus and has got the Muslim League to pass a resolution favouring the vivisection of India into two? If you do, what becomes of your formula that there is no Swaraj without communal unity?”
“I admit that the step taken by the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation. But I do not regard it so baffling so as to make civil disobedience an impossibility. Supposing that the Congress is reduced to a hopeless minority, it will still be open to it, and indeed it may be its duty to resort to civil obedience. The struggle will not be against the majority but it will be against the foreign ruler. If the struggle succeeds the fruits there of will be reaped as well by the Congress as by the opposing majority…….I know no non-violent method of compelling obedience of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India……Any member may claim a division …..Thus so far as I am concerned, my proposition that there is no Swaraj without communal unity holds as good today, as when I first enunciated it in 1919.”
Gandhi’s acceptance that Muslims as a member of a joint family can claim a division is to be seen in the whole context of Gandhi’s views of communal amity as a pre-requisite for attaining Swaraj and not to be quoted out of context  to say he was a party to the "engineering" as the author has done. (Gandhi also drives home the point (in the above article)  whether you are in majority or minority, your  fight sould be  against the foreign ruler and not amongst  own countrymen! Why the author has missed this portion ?)

It was Jinnah in 1944 who insisted that “Let Mr. Gandhi join hands with the Muslim league on the basis Pakistan in plain, unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer the independence of the people of India. ….. But at last – and it is good and conducive to further progress –Mr. Gandhi has, at any rate, in his personal capacity accepted the principle of partition or division of India. What remains now is the question of how and when this got to be carried out….. As regards the merits of the proposals, Mr.Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan” Is the author referring to Gandhi’s above proposals as modalities his discussed with Mr. Jinnah? Does it mean that Gandhi "engineered" the partition?

Much has been said about the Cabinet Mission Plan and the acceptance of the same by Congress no way becomes a part of the “engineering” by the Congress for partition.

It is absurd to conclude that the Congress ‘engineered” the partition of the Country while the basic demand for the same came from and the beneficiaries (The League, The British) were every one else other than the Congress. Is it not absurd to equate the acceptance of partition as a reality by the Congress as ‘engineering'  of the same?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 440

Book Reference: Page 440 Para 2

Author’s Views: Narrating the Radcliffe Commission and Awards, the author states that in spite of his standing as an eminent citizen of Great Britain, Cyril John Radcliffe became a highly controversial figure as the Chairman of the Boundary Commission to delineate the new boundaries. To ensure neutrality of such a Commission, the author emphasizes that relationship between politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and there will not be non-partisan administrators to work out the partitioning process. The author further narrates that Jinnah favoured a commission composed of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations. The Congress (Nehru) opposed Jinnah’s above proposal. Comparing this act of opposition by Nehru, the author remarks that it is ironical that Nehru, as the Prime Minister of India referred in great hurry, poor judgment and due to Lord Mountbatten’s insistence referred the Kashmir issue to the UN.

Comments: I am surprised how the author has overlooked a basic difference. When Nehru referred the J&K Issue to UN, (hasty, ill-judged, goaded or otherwise), India and Pakistan had already become separate Nations and were at war. How can Congress or Nehru ask UN to intervene when in 1947, the nation itself was still under the British and the dispute was between two political entities of a yet to be born free nation? If the dispute was to be referred to UN, it could be initiated only by the British who have still not vacated India! To justify the demand of Jinnah for a UN appointed Commission, the author advances his theory that politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and the administration can never be just and impartial in a political system in spite of the oft repeated claims to the contrary.

Does the author imply that where in we have the federal structure in place, the administration is overshadowed by politics? The author has been a Minister in the Central Government holding important portfolios for a fairly long period of time and is a Parliamentarian of repute. Does he mean all commissions for arbitrating disputes among the States in India were/are partial and swayed by political considerations? Does the author want the water sharing dispute between Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, the border disputes between Maharshtra and Karnataka and the demand for Telengana etc to be referred to UN appointed commissions? The politicians when they become parliamentarians and Executives as ministers take an oath to uphold the Constitution of India and to discharge their duties without any bias or favour. The author might have been swayed by the corroded present day political climate to make such a sweeping conclusion. The British, what ever else they can be accused of, were never faulted for their water- tight separation of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 419

Book Reference: Page 419

Author’s Views: Commenting on the Congress Working Committee Resolution of 8th March 1947, the author concludes that it was a sad commentary on the Congress party, which just about a thirty years ago, opposed even the partition of Bengal to have proposed the partition of India.

Comments: Should we then give the credit for creating Pakistan to Congress and its leaders? I feel robbing this credit from the Muslim League headed by Jinnah is blatantly unfair.

The author, in page 420, quoting from the book ‘Last days of the Raj, informs that VP Menon, the Reforms Commissioner and Advisor to the Viceroy recapitulated a talk he had with Patel in Simla. He is reported to have told Patel that Jinnah had the support of influential British opinion in his claim for Pakistan, and also more importantly, Jinnah was supported by most of the high officers of the Army in India.Please see my last post in this blog ,  the part played by the British Officer Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart who took over as the Army Chief on August 15, 1947 on Pakistan's invasion  of Kashmir in October.

Why should the author also rob the British and of the high British Army officers (there were not many high Commissioned Indian Officers in those days) the credit for the creation of Pakistan?

In page 449, the author asserts that only Jinnah could have mastered Fazl-ul Haq, Sir Sikandar and Khizar who were opposed to Pakistan. Jinnah united the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab despite these leaders and made them demand Pakistan. The author asserts that there was no other Muslim leader to even attempt such a feat, much less achieve success in it. Pakistan, the author concludes, was becoming a reality as a result of Jinnah’s individual “pertinacity.” ( whatever it may mean). (Please read authors original text to appreciate his vehement narration). Why he then blames the Congress?

Also compare from what the author states in Page 489. The answer (cure?), Jinnah asserted, lay only in parting. Nehru and Patel and others of the Congress followed.

While the Congress Party was working its way to obtain freedom of the entire Nation, Mr. Jinnah was working for the creation of Pakistan alone. To that extent he even favoured a Commission of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations to delineate the boundaries.  In effect, he did not believe in the neutrality of even the British who were all along been favourable to him and with whom he had a tacit understanding (we will keep you safe in Delhi!) only to keep the Congress at bay!

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 383-385

Book Reference: Page 383 -385

Author’s Views: The author as a prelude to the Calcutta riots of August 1946 narrates various troubles that were simmering in Calcutta from 1945 onwards. Though he qualifies these events  as non-communal , he says that  the after effects of these strikes though non-communal and concerned with  local issues, overlapped each other promoting violence and disorder. The reader is urged to go through the original text.

Comments: It appears that the author wants the reader to believe that the killings and arson in Calcutta as a fall out of ‘Direct Action day’ are to be taken as a matter of routine. Because as per the author, after all , that was the way things were happening in Calcutta from November 1945 onwards for almost a year and there was nothing to suggest that the killings and arson from August 16 to August 19, 1946 (with the full connivance of the Local Government)  were anything different!!! How bizarre his intentions are.

It is a well-known fact supported by recorded evidence, that in support of the resolution of July 29 of the Muslim League for "Direct Action" for creation of Pakistan, inflammatory speeches were made. Statements and pamphlets by responsible members of the League and Ministers were circulated widely to inflame a large section of Muslim masses. The government of Bengal declared August 16 as a public holiday. This created an impression that the observance of August 16 as ‘Direct Action day’ was tacitly approved by the Government of Bengal and any one not joining could claim no protection from the Government. There was no police, not even traffic police to be seen on August 16. The curfew order was not enforced even after it was proclaimed for the first two nights. Detailed description of the mayhem is available in the world wide web (Search for Calcutta Killings of August 1946) and I need not deal with it further. But the question to be asked to the author, did all other agitations, protests and riots from November 1945 onwards (as the author narrates in the pages quoted above), had the same response from the government like the ones on August 16-19?

In a public meeting in Delhi, Ganzafar Ali Khan declared, “ the aim of our direct action is to paralyze Nehru’s Government which will vanish like the historic half-day rule of Nizam the water carrier ….Muslims will resist such a government with their blood.”

Were such inflammatory speeches  made to incite the public for other agitations in Calcutta from November 1945? Does the author want to state that the Calcutta killings and arson of August 16-19 are nothing peculiar but to be taken as routine events of Calcutta? Why he is trying to defend an indefensible?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review page 372-378

Book Reference: Page 372 -378

Author’s Views: Discussing about the issue of parity and Jinnah’s opposition to various modifications and invitations sent directly to the Muslim Leaders by the Government etc, the author states that Jinnah even at that stage did not refuse to participate in the interim government.

Comments: In the same page (373), the author states, on 19 Jun 1946 he raised the issue again with Wavell. He objected to change in the composition. Though he was fully authorized by the Working Committee of the League to take any decision as he deemed fit, he raised the sham of referring the matter before the Working Committee. He objected to the way the Viceroy sent invitations directly to the Muslim Leaguers to join the interim government. He objected to the nomination of Mr. Jagjivan Ram by the Congress. Still the author wants the readers to believe that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the government though he was making it very clear that in case he did not have his way, he would not agree to participate.

Page 373: The author states that the letter of the Congress President to the Viceroy, and the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, of June 25, 1946 actually confused the matter. He concludes that the game of one-upmanship had become destructive. The author goes on to give some excerpts though later on says summarizing  them or making an outline  of them would be full of incalculable danger!

Comments: The author gives the impression that the matter became complex due to one-up man ship of the Congress and secondly due to the (valid) points raised by the Congress to reiterate its policy that they are free to decide whom to delegate and thirdly due to the the reported refusal of the Viceroy to accept a Congress Muslim member among the representatives of the Congress. The Viceroy had earlier assured that he could not accept the right of the Congress to object to names put forward by the Muslim league any more than he would accept similar objections from the other side. For argument sake, if we assume that a non congress scheduled caste member later switches his allegiance/ support to Congress after the formation of the interim government what would happen? Would he say “I will not resign since I am appointed by the Viceroy, though now I have switched my loyalty to Congress?” Or was it that Mr. Jinnah wanted a man of his choice to represent the scheduled castes also?

We have to remember that Mr. Jinnah had already made up his mind. He was apprehensive that once he agrees to the formation and functioning of the constitution making body, the realization of Pakistan would recede to a later date. It is therefore not out of place when the Secretary of State accused Jinnah of sabotaging the prospects for an interim government, laying the blame on Jinnah for publishing his letter to Wavell of 19 Jun. (Page 376) Had it not been published neither the Congress President would have written the letter nor the Congress Working Committee would have sent the resolution. While that was the case, the author blaming the Congress for confounding the problem is baseless.

 Page 377: The author states to the effect that due to the Cabinet Mission’s refusal to invite the Muslim League alone to form the interim government, communal rioting in an ugly form again broke out in Ahmedabad.

Comments: How could the Cabinet Mission invite only Muslim League to form the interim government? The Mission tried its level best to accommodate, as much as it could, the demands of Mr. Jinnah so that the interests of the Muslim League were adequately guaranteed. But as said before the fear of the League lay elsewhere. The fear of the unknown as to how the constitution will take shape. Mr. Jinnah was always insisting on drafting two different bodies for evolving two different Constitutions, one for the Muslims and the other for others. He was perhaps apprehensive whether his aim of the carving out a sovereign state of Pakistan will fructify in the near future. His health was already deteriorating.

Page 378: Commenting on the Press Conference of Jawaharlal Nehru of 10 July 1946 and its after effects, the author says that it is difficult to believe that Nehru would not have anticipated what the fall out of such conference or his interviews could be.

Comments: Is it not equally difficult to give the benefit of doubt to Mr. Jinnah for not having known in advance what, the fall out will be of his releasing to the press his letter to Wavell of 19 June. Irrespective what Azad commented on Nehru’s interview and what Patel said of Nehru’s emotional immaturity (page 380- 381), Nehru’s interview gave a reasoning and an opportunity for Mr. Jinnah to refuse co-operation. The fact remains that it took another two months (2nd September 1946 to be precise) for the announcement of the appointment of the new council. In the interim, Nehru in his capacity as the President of the Congress wrote to Jinnah, suggesting a coalition government. (Notwithstanding the author appreciating of Wavell’s objectivity to have termed the Congress acquiescence as a dishonest acceptance Page 377). Jinnah replied that “ that the Wardha resolution of the Congress of 8 August 1946 does not call for a revision of the League decision.” In effect it was either we alone or whom we nominate and accept as members of the interim Government or we boycott!!! That is the crux of Jinnah’s stand, which the readers must appreciate.

In spite of the assurance that the British Government  would adhere to the Cabinet Mission plan of 16 May, given in the British parliament on 18 July, the Muslim League Council in Bombay on 27 July 1946 reiterated the demand for Pakistan and declared August 16 as "Direct Action "day. Does the author still wants us to beleive that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the interim government?