Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 460

Book Reference: Page 460

Author’s Views: Narrating the events leading to the appointment of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan, the author says that on 4th July 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan, conveyed, in a letter to Mountbatten ‘formally to recommend to the king the appointment of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the governor-general of Pakistan. He also, in that letter expressed the hope that Mountbatten would remain as Governor-general of India. The reader is urged to go through the analysis of the author in the succeeding paras in pages 461 –463.

Comments: Probably it  was neither megalomania on his part nor having a constitutional head placed in an impossible situation, the reason for Mr. Jinnah to assume the appointment of Governor General of Pakistan (rather than conceding it to Mountbatten immediately on getting independence). As the subsequent events would show, it appears to have been a calculated master strategic stroke . Kashmir, the Princely State, the third letter in the acronym of “Pakistan” has not decided to join them. The Maharaja of J and K was thinking of making it a neutral country in the lines of Switzerland. It was also feared that there was a possibility that he might accede to India, as J&K was geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan.

By August 1947 (and even earlier) India was already grappling with the influx of refugees, food shortages and  lack of most of the essential services. The Armed forces were getting reorganized. This was the most opportune time  to invade Kashmir by proxy backed by regular forces. The planning and preparation for that probably had already been finalized in their drawing boards. It commenced in October 1947 barely within two months of Jinnah assuming office of the Governor General. Had Mountbatten taken over as the Governor General of Pakistan, in his capacity of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he would have got wind of it and could not have permitted employment of regular forces to take part in the invasion of Kashmir.
He might have even sounded India in advance. (He remained in India till June 1948). Lt.Gen. Sinha , in an article in Deccan Chronicle narrates the events leading to the dismissal of Sir. Robert. Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart, who took over as Army Chief of India on 15 august 1947, "was informed by his British counterpart in Pakistan of the preperations  being made for the invasion of Kashmir . He failed to apprise the Government nor did he take any action in the matter. Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 cought us totally unprepared. The Indian Army miraculously managed to retrieve the situation."
It was probably this fore planning  which is the more likely reason for getting rid of Mountbatten from Pakistan on their getting independence. If there was any cunning plan that was this (cf Page 455). As far as the knowledge of the commentator, this reasoning for assuming the of the appointment of Governor General of Pakistan on its independence by Mr. Jinnah has not been recorded anywhere. As the learned author puts it (Page 525) “ Only the Supreme God knows all.”

I conclude my post  and this blog with the following simple comment on the book . While Mahatma Gandhi changed the course of the history of India, Shri. Jaswant Singh through his book has changed  its history itself!"

Commentator's Note : I reiterate what I said in the first post of this blog "I hold Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah in high esteem. He was undoubtedly one of the greatest leader of the sub-continent of the century. His championing the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity as lauded by Gopal Krishna Gokhale needs no further elaboration. He was a great orator and an incisive analyst of political and social realities. His obduracy was matching and even excelled that of Gandhi's. While Gandhi would relent ultimately to the 'inevitable', what Jinnah said and believed in were inevitable. In my comments whereever I have referred Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah as Jinnah , they have to be assumed as having the full adjectives and honour he commands. He is referred as "Jinnah" only because of the sources from where the context is taken refer him as such. No disrespect is meant by the commentator.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 454-455

Book Reference: Page 454-455

Author’s Views: Narrating the proceedings of the AICC meeting on 14-15 June 1947, quoting Lohia the author says that Gandhi wanted the Congress party to honour the commitments made by its leaders namely Nehru and Patel. He wanted the Congress to accept the principle of partition and having done that should make a declaration regarding its execution. Once the Congress and the Muslim League had signified the acceptance of partition, the British Government and the Viceroy should be told to step aside and the partitioning of the country should be carried out jointly by the Congress and the Muslim League with no intervention from a third party.

The author concludes that though so much has been said about Gandhi, the saint was at the same time a tactician; the above fine and cunning proposal as per author’s knowledge has not been put on record.

Comments: The adjective ‘Fine’ for Gandhi’s advice to the Congress Leaders is very apt but ‘Cunning’ - against whom? From the time of the First RTC (and even before that) Gandhi had times with out number in his speeches, writings, in conferences had driven only this point, ie. “ Leave us alone and get out, we will solve our problems and differences ourselves.” He was even prepared to accept if the nation was embroiled by anarchy and blood shed. But this appeal of his found favour neither with the British nor with the Muslim League. There is nothing cunning in his proposal. He always felt that if two brothers of the family fight and go their separate ways they would still continue to be brothers and there should be no need for a third party to poke its nose. But this approach of Gandhi was never ever agreed to by the Muslim League. They felt the British, who have enslaved the country and exploited its resources for the last 200 years would be more dependable than their own fellow countrymen.

To quote from Gandhi’s speech on 8th August 1942: “ many friends have come and asked me to agree to it (Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan) for the time being to placate Mr. Jinnah, disarm his suspicions and to see how he reacts to it. But I cannot be party to a course of action with a false promise. At any rate, it is not my method…” To impute that Gandhi had cunning proposal is a gross injustice.

The more logical reasoning for acceptance of the proposal was given by Nehru (Page 457): “Even if we get freedom for India (undivided), with that background, it would be very weak India; that is a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls. And also the fact that we saw no other way of getting our freedom – in the near future, I mean.” It is a historical fact that right from the time of the Romans and Greeks and then the Mouryas and later the Moguls, leaving the powers to federated units and having a weak central leadership invariably resulted in the disintegration of their respective empires. History would have by now repeated itself and the balkanization of the sub-continent would have become a reality. Nehru further said “ if others do not want to be in it, how can we and why should we force them to be in it?” Another important reason was the wanton killings that were going on in Punjab, which Nehru wanted to bring to an early end.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 451

Book Reference: Page 451 para 3

Author’s Views: Narrating the Congress Partition Plan the author quotes from BR Nanda’s essay on “ Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the partition of India 1935-47”, that Nehru and Patel agreed for partition of India because they were power hungry. The acceptance of Partition by the Congress had started after the Muslim League’s Pakistan Resolution in their Lahore Session itself. The author quotes Gandhi’s writing of April 1940 “ The Muslims must have the same right to self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division”. The author further states that the Congress Working Committee resolution two years later expressed the same sentiment.  He states that, in 1944 Gandhi not only conceded the principle of partition but also discussed the modalities with Jinnah. He further adds to the effect that the very acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan by the Congress indicated their willingness for partition.

The author concludes that the Congress “engineered” the partition of India in this manner.

Comments: The author’s conclusion, to say the least is ridiculous. The moment the masses came to know of the impending division of the Country, there were wide spread arson, pillages and the like to dislocate and drive away the innocent public. Delaying further the declaration of independence would have only escalated the misery. At least, immediately after the declaration, the respective Governments could try and control the wanton destruction on both sides. That is why Nehru and Patel hastened to agree for the Partition. We have already seen that the British were determined to carve out Pakistan (Appendix xi).

The Muslim League session was held in Lahore at the end of March 1940. The text of Pakistan resolution   " Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or be acceptable to the Musalmans unless it is designed on the following basic principles namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions, which should be so constituted with such-territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent states’ , in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”
It is left to the reader to deduce as to who did the so-called “engineering” of the partition.

The author very cleverly quotes Mahatma Gandhi out of context to prove his point. After the Lahore Resolution of the League of March 1940,Gandhi wrote  an article entitled “A Baffling Situation”, (Excerpts)  "A question has been put to me; Do you intend to start general civil obedience although Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah has declared war against Hindus and has got the Muslim League to pass a resolution favouring the vivisection of India into two? If you do, what becomes of your formula that there is no Swaraj without communal unity?”
“I admit that the step taken by the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation. But I do not regard it so baffling so as to make civil disobedience an impossibility. Supposing that the Congress is reduced to a hopeless minority, it will still be open to it, and indeed it may be its duty to resort to civil obedience. The struggle will not be against the majority but it will be against the foreign ruler. If the struggle succeeds the fruits there of will be reaped as well by the Congress as by the opposing majority…….I know no non-violent method of compelling obedience of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India……Any member may claim a division …..Thus so far as I am concerned, my proposition that there is no Swaraj without communal unity holds as good today, as when I first enunciated it in 1919.”
Gandhi’s acceptance that Muslims as a member of a joint family can claim a division is to be seen in the whole context of Gandhi’s views of communal amity as a pre-requisite for attaining Swaraj and not to be quoted out of context  to say he was a party to the "engineering" as the author has done. (Gandhi also drives home the point (in the above article)  whether you are in majority or minority, your  fight sould be  against the foreign ruler and not amongst  own countrymen! Why the author has missed this portion ?)

It was Jinnah in 1944 who insisted that “Let Mr. Gandhi join hands with the Muslim league on the basis Pakistan in plain, unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer the independence of the people of India. ….. But at last – and it is good and conducive to further progress –Mr. Gandhi has, at any rate, in his personal capacity accepted the principle of partition or division of India. What remains now is the question of how and when this got to be carried out….. As regards the merits of the proposals, Mr.Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan” Is the author referring to Gandhi’s above proposals as modalities his discussed with Mr. Jinnah? Does it mean that Gandhi "engineered" the partition?

Much has been said about the Cabinet Mission Plan and the acceptance of the same by Congress no way becomes a part of the “engineering” by the Congress for partition.

It is absurd to conclude that the Congress ‘engineered” the partition of the Country while the basic demand for the same came from and the beneficiaries (The League, The British) were every one else other than the Congress. Is it not absurd to equate the acceptance of partition as a reality by the Congress as ‘engineering'  of the same?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 440

Book Reference: Page 440 Para 2

Author’s Views: Narrating the Radcliffe Commission and Awards, the author states that in spite of his standing as an eminent citizen of Great Britain, Cyril John Radcliffe became a highly controversial figure as the Chairman of the Boundary Commission to delineate the new boundaries. To ensure neutrality of such a Commission, the author emphasizes that relationship between politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and there will not be non-partisan administrators to work out the partitioning process. The author further narrates that Jinnah favoured a commission composed of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations. The Congress (Nehru) opposed Jinnah’s above proposal. Comparing this act of opposition by Nehru, the author remarks that it is ironical that Nehru, as the Prime Minister of India referred in great hurry, poor judgment and due to Lord Mountbatten’s insistence referred the Kashmir issue to the UN.

Comments: I am surprised how the author has overlooked a basic difference. When Nehru referred the J&K Issue to UN, (hasty, ill-judged, goaded or otherwise), India and Pakistan had already become separate Nations and were at war. How can Congress or Nehru ask UN to intervene when in 1947, the nation itself was still under the British and the dispute was between two political entities of a yet to be born free nation? If the dispute was to be referred to UN, it could be initiated only by the British who have still not vacated India! To justify the demand of Jinnah for a UN appointed Commission, the author advances his theory that politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and the administration can never be just and impartial in a political system in spite of the oft repeated claims to the contrary.

Does the author imply that where in we have the federal structure in place, the administration is overshadowed by politics? The author has been a Minister in the Central Government holding important portfolios for a fairly long period of time and is a Parliamentarian of repute. Does he mean all commissions for arbitrating disputes among the States in India were/are partial and swayed by political considerations? Does the author want the water sharing dispute between Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, the border disputes between Maharshtra and Karnataka and the demand for Telengana etc to be referred to UN appointed commissions? The politicians when they become parliamentarians and Executives as ministers take an oath to uphold the Constitution of India and to discharge their duties without any bias or favour. The author might have been swayed by the corroded present day political climate to make such a sweeping conclusion. The British, what ever else they can be accused of, were never faulted for their water- tight separation of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 419

Book Reference: Page 419

Author’s Views: Commenting on the Congress Working Committee Resolution of 8th March 1947, the author concludes that it was a sad commentary on the Congress party, which just about a thirty years ago, opposed even the partition of Bengal to have proposed the partition of India.

Comments: Should we then give the credit for creating Pakistan to Congress and its leaders? I feel robbing this credit from the Muslim League headed by Jinnah is blatantly unfair.

The author, in page 420, quoting from the book ‘Last days of the Raj, informs that VP Menon, the Reforms Commissioner and Advisor to the Viceroy recapitulated a talk he had with Patel in Simla. He is reported to have told Patel that Jinnah had the support of influential British opinion in his claim for Pakistan, and also more importantly, Jinnah was supported by most of the high officers of the Army in India.Please see my last post in this blog ,  the part played by the British Officer Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart who took over as the Army Chief on August 15, 1947 on Pakistan's invasion  of Kashmir in October.

Why should the author also rob the British and of the high British Army officers (there were not many high Commissioned Indian Officers in those days) the credit for the creation of Pakistan?

In page 449, the author asserts that only Jinnah could have mastered Fazl-ul Haq, Sir Sikandar and Khizar who were opposed to Pakistan. Jinnah united the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab despite these leaders and made them demand Pakistan. The author asserts that there was no other Muslim leader to even attempt such a feat, much less achieve success in it. Pakistan, the author concludes, was becoming a reality as a result of Jinnah’s individual “pertinacity.” ( whatever it may mean). (Please read authors original text to appreciate his vehement narration). Why he then blames the Congress?

Also compare from what the author states in Page 489. The answer (cure?), Jinnah asserted, lay only in parting. Nehru and Patel and others of the Congress followed.

While the Congress Party was working its way to obtain freedom of the entire Nation, Mr. Jinnah was working for the creation of Pakistan alone. To that extent he even favoured a Commission of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations to delineate the boundaries.  In effect, he did not believe in the neutrality of even the British who were all along been favourable to him and with whom he had a tacit understanding (we will keep you safe in Delhi!) only to keep the Congress at bay!

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 383-385

Book Reference: Page 383 -385

Author’s Views: The author as a prelude to the Calcutta riots of August 1946 narrates various troubles that were simmering in Calcutta from 1945 onwards. Though he qualifies these events  as non-communal , he says that  the after effects of these strikes though non-communal and concerned with  local issues, overlapped each other promoting violence and disorder. The reader is urged to go through the original text.

Comments: It appears that the author wants the reader to believe that the killings and arson in Calcutta as a fall out of ‘Direct Action day’ are to be taken as a matter of routine. Because as per the author, after all , that was the way things were happening in Calcutta from November 1945 onwards for almost a year and there was nothing to suggest that the killings and arson from August 16 to August 19, 1946 (with the full connivance of the Local Government)  were anything different!!! How bizarre his intentions are.

It is a well-known fact supported by recorded evidence, that in support of the resolution of July 29 of the Muslim League for "Direct Action" for creation of Pakistan, inflammatory speeches were made. Statements and pamphlets by responsible members of the League and Ministers were circulated widely to inflame a large section of Muslim masses. The government of Bengal declared August 16 as a public holiday. This created an impression that the observance of August 16 as ‘Direct Action day’ was tacitly approved by the Government of Bengal and any one not joining could claim no protection from the Government. There was no police, not even traffic police to be seen on August 16. The curfew order was not enforced even after it was proclaimed for the first two nights. Detailed description of the mayhem is available in the world wide web (Search for Calcutta Killings of August 1946) and I need not deal with it further. But the question to be asked to the author, did all other agitations, protests and riots from November 1945 onwards (as the author narrates in the pages quoted above), had the same response from the government like the ones on August 16-19?

In a public meeting in Delhi, Ganzafar Ali Khan declared, “ the aim of our direct action is to paralyze Nehru’s Government which will vanish like the historic half-day rule of Nizam the water carrier ….Muslims will resist such a government with their blood.”

Were such inflammatory speeches  made to incite the public for other agitations in Calcutta from November 1945? Does the author want to state that the Calcutta killings and arson of August 16-19 are nothing peculiar but to be taken as routine events of Calcutta? Why he is trying to defend an indefensible?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review page 372-378

Book Reference: Page 372 -378

Author’s Views: Discussing about the issue of parity and Jinnah’s opposition to various modifications and invitations sent directly to the Muslim Leaders by the Government etc, the author states that Jinnah even at that stage did not refuse to participate in the interim government.

Comments: In the same page (373), the author states, on 19 Jun 1946 he raised the issue again with Wavell. He objected to change in the composition. Though he was fully authorized by the Working Committee of the League to take any decision as he deemed fit, he raised the sham of referring the matter before the Working Committee. He objected to the way the Viceroy sent invitations directly to the Muslim Leaguers to join the interim government. He objected to the nomination of Mr. Jagjivan Ram by the Congress. Still the author wants the readers to believe that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the government though he was making it very clear that in case he did not have his way, he would not agree to participate.

Page 373: The author states that the letter of the Congress President to the Viceroy, and the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, of June 25, 1946 actually confused the matter. He concludes that the game of one-upmanship had become destructive. The author goes on to give some excerpts though later on says summarizing  them or making an outline  of them would be full of incalculable danger!

Comments: The author gives the impression that the matter became complex due to one-up man ship of the Congress and secondly due to the (valid) points raised by the Congress to reiterate its policy that they are free to decide whom to delegate and thirdly due to the the reported refusal of the Viceroy to accept a Congress Muslim member among the representatives of the Congress. The Viceroy had earlier assured that he could not accept the right of the Congress to object to names put forward by the Muslim league any more than he would accept similar objections from the other side. For argument sake, if we assume that a non congress scheduled caste member later switches his allegiance/ support to Congress after the formation of the interim government what would happen? Would he say “I will not resign since I am appointed by the Viceroy, though now I have switched my loyalty to Congress?” Or was it that Mr. Jinnah wanted a man of his choice to represent the scheduled castes also?

We have to remember that Mr. Jinnah had already made up his mind. He was apprehensive that once he agrees to the formation and functioning of the constitution making body, the realization of Pakistan would recede to a later date. It is therefore not out of place when the Secretary of State accused Jinnah of sabotaging the prospects for an interim government, laying the blame on Jinnah for publishing his letter to Wavell of 19 Jun. (Page 376) Had it not been published neither the Congress President would have written the letter nor the Congress Working Committee would have sent the resolution. While that was the case, the author blaming the Congress for confounding the problem is baseless.

 Page 377: The author states to the effect that due to the Cabinet Mission’s refusal to invite the Muslim League alone to form the interim government, communal rioting in an ugly form again broke out in Ahmedabad.

Comments: How could the Cabinet Mission invite only Muslim League to form the interim government? The Mission tried its level best to accommodate, as much as it could, the demands of Mr. Jinnah so that the interests of the Muslim League were adequately guaranteed. But as said before the fear of the League lay elsewhere. The fear of the unknown as to how the constitution will take shape. Mr. Jinnah was always insisting on drafting two different bodies for evolving two different Constitutions, one for the Muslims and the other for others. He was perhaps apprehensive whether his aim of the carving out a sovereign state of Pakistan will fructify in the near future. His health was already deteriorating.

Page 378: Commenting on the Press Conference of Jawaharlal Nehru of 10 July 1946 and its after effects, the author says that it is difficult to believe that Nehru would not have anticipated what the fall out of such conference or his interviews could be.

Comments: Is it not equally difficult to give the benefit of doubt to Mr. Jinnah for not having known in advance what, the fall out will be of his releasing to the press his letter to Wavell of 19 June. Irrespective what Azad commented on Nehru’s interview and what Patel said of Nehru’s emotional immaturity (page 380- 381), Nehru’s interview gave a reasoning and an opportunity for Mr. Jinnah to refuse co-operation. The fact remains that it took another two months (2nd September 1946 to be precise) for the announcement of the appointment of the new council. In the interim, Nehru in his capacity as the President of the Congress wrote to Jinnah, suggesting a coalition government. (Notwithstanding the author appreciating of Wavell’s objectivity to have termed the Congress acquiescence as a dishonest acceptance Page 377). Jinnah replied that “ that the Wardha resolution of the Congress of 8 August 1946 does not call for a revision of the League decision.” In effect it was either we alone or whom we nominate and accept as members of the interim Government or we boycott!!! That is the crux of Jinnah’s stand, which the readers must appreciate.

In spite of the assurance that the British Government  would adhere to the Cabinet Mission plan of 16 May, given in the British parliament on 18 July, the Muslim League Council in Bombay on 27 July 1946 reiterated the demand for Pakistan and declared August 16 as "Direct Action "day. Does the author still wants us to beleive that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the interim government?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 341-353

Book Reference: Page 341 – 353 Simla Conference of June 1945

Author’s Views: Page 341:  It came to light later that Jinnah had expressed it as a grievance Gandhi’s withdrawal from the conference.

Comments: Compare (from page 313) when Gandhi, after obtaining Jinnah’s concurrence, went to meet him in Bombay on 9 September 1944 at his residence. At the very beginning Jinnah questioned the representative capacity of Gandhi. Where is the grievance now (in 1945) for Jinnah for Gandhi’s non-participation in the Simla Conference, when Gandhi’s status has not changed politically? As the author narrates from the interview of Gandhi with Preston Grover, Gandhi had said that if Jinnah had wanted, he could take him there? Did that happen? Is there any record to show that Jinnah wrote / spoke to Gandhi to change his stand and attend the Conference? What is the point in projecting the so-called grievance? 

Page 343: The author narrates that the Viceroy asked all the delegates representing varied interests to hand over a list of persons they would like to be included in the national government. Jinnah posed a lot of conditions. When the Viceroy asked him (Jinnah) whether the League would submit the list of names or not, Jinnah answered that he was there only in his individual capacity. He wanted the Viceroy’s proposal in writing to place before the Working Committee of the League.

Comments: All along Jinnah had been proclaiming that he was the undisputed and sole spokesman for the League. Here he says he has come on his individual capacity. Nevertheless, in his reply to Viceroy, he goes back to what happened during Lord Linlithgow’s time (page 344). Linlithgow’s alternative proposal accepted that the panel of names from the Muslim League would be based on the discussion of the Leader of the party and Viceroy and not on the formal panel of names submitted by the party! He concludes his letter regretting his inability (to forward the names), as desired by the Executive Committee of the League, as the Viceroy could not give the assurance that all the Muslim Members of the proposed Executive Council will be selected from the Muslim League only. The points to ponder are:

1. The Viceroy had clarified during his face-to-face talk that he can give no such assurance.


2. Jinnah quotes Linlithgow’s acceptance that the list will be based what the Viceroy and the leader of the Party (himself) decide and not what the party sends formally. (The leader of the party wields more authority than the Committee)

3. He regrets his inability to send the list of names as desired by the Executive Committee of the League. (Here the Committee wields more authority)

Now the reader can come to his own conclusion as to who was responsible for the failure of Simla Conference, even though the Viceroy was gracious enough to apportion the blame on himself

Page 346: Jinnah, who earlier proclaimed that the Muslim League was the champion and protector of all minorities and the Congress did not even represent all Hindus, says in a statement that the representatives of all minorities have the same goal as and ideology of a united India as that of Congress and they are knitted closely to Hindu society. The root cause of the failure was doubtless Jinnah’s intransigence about Muslim representation and equality of the Muslim vote with all others combined.


Comments: Elsewhere in many places in the book the author has blamed Congress and its leaders for delaying the attainment of colonial status, freedom, forming of provisional government etc. How Jinnah played the minorities card is amply explained by the author himself in this page. Jinnah’s demand that League alone would nominate any Muslim member to the Council, in spite of the fact that in only Assam and Sindh had League ministries proves another fact that Jinnah had made up his mind for the partition of India as the price for freedom for the subcontinent. If it has to be delayed indefinitely it mattered nothing to him. The analysis of Dr. Jayakar is very apt. (Page 346)

Page 352: On the announcement of fresh elections in late 1945, the author states that the Congress lost another opportunity by its President not meeting or writing to the Viceroy their wish to return to the office in the provinces from where they were dismissed. The author further concludes that the Viceroy would not have found it easy to refuse; rather he would have welcomed it.


Comments: Yes! If they were today’s politicians they would have even begged the Viceroy . But the principles exhibited by the Congress Party of those days precluded any such effort by its leadership. Also what would have the League done. They would have decried the Congress as hankering after power and with a supportive press in England brought the image of the Congress down. How the author has come to the conclusion that the Viceroy would have welcomed such a request has not been substantiated.

(However, what the results of the elections demonstrated, is vividly described by the author in pages 354 and 355. In a nutshell, their failure added further resolve for the League’s demand for Pakistan as they found to their dismay, in a democratic undivided India, they will find themselves only in opposition irrespective of reservations)

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 302

Book Reference: Page 302-305

Author’s Views: Elaborating on the Viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow, the author in page 305 says, that though the British encouraged the demand for Pakistan, by the League, they did not identify themselves with it. (The reader will have a first hand knowledge from the above pages of the book, how Linlithgow did everything in his power and beyond it, to widen the chasm between the Political parties in general and between the Congress and the League in particular)

Comments: The author concedes the role played by the British through the actions of the Viceroy. That they did not identify themselves with the league’s demand of Pakistan is questionable. As we have seen earlier, the demand of the League was a welcome cloak. For once, they were very sure of Nehru’s ascendancy in the free India (and his socialistic leanings) who would not toe the lines of the West blindly. Secondly they would need a buffer state in the west oriented to Western ideology, weak and having dependence on the West. Even before the Note of Field Marshal Auchinleck of 1946, (See Appendix XI to chapter 8 page 557) the requirement of creating a buffer state inimical to the interest of free India and owing allegiance to the Crown in future, in the North West of the subcontinent as a strategic necessity, was recognized by the British. Jinnah’s demand, strengthened by the Viceroy’s partiality and patent support of the League’s demands came very handy to alienate Congress further and make them accept the Partition as inevitable. (See also author’s remarks in page 305 last five lines.)

Writing on the Gandhi –Jinnah talks of September 1911, the author states that (page 319) Gandhi then wanted an answer from Jinnah as to how the independent states as propounded by him wold be benefited by the split and would they not become a menace to themselves and to the rest of India. Jinnah replied to the effect that it was the only solution of the Indian problem and the price India (ie the rest of India) must pay for its independence.

Comments: After reading the narration of the author, is it not obvious that Jinnah would have opposed tooth and nail the freedom of the subcontinent and the departure of British unless and until his demand for Pakistan was not first met? No doubt that Jinnah is the architect and creator of Pakistan and rightly called as such, but the freedom for India had come only because it had to pay the price as quoted by Jinnah. Why then blame Nehru, Patel or Gandhi or the Congress or even the British. Gandhi’s later inter locution also becomes irrelevant (Pages 322-325) for discussion.

The author in his concluding paragraph of Chapter 6 (Page 330) says that what was sought by the Muslims was just a convincing enough space to safe guard against majoritarianism (what ever it may mean) and enable them to arbitrate their own social, religious and political destinies and a reassuring system, “ ideally (still) in India, but outside, if inevitable.”

How, after himself narrating the back ground for the demand of Pakistan in the preceding pages, the author arrives at the above conclusion that “they still believed it to be ideal to be with in India”, is beyond comprehension. The ‘inevitable’ has been already spelt out by Jinnah, as the price India has to pay for freedom. In page 322 last para commenting on the answer given by Jinnah to a question of Gandhi, the author states that Jinnah wanted the envisaged Pakistan areas would be hostile to the rest of India or would even make war upon her if there was no joint concern. So much for the attitude, the author is craving about in page 330 and for his shedding copious tears for the human tragedy and the hasty vivisection of India entailed (page 331). As Jinnah had aptly put it that was the “price you have to pay if you want freedom from the British.” Are we not still paying the price, even six decades after independence?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 297

Book Reference: Page 297 -298

Author’s Views: Narrating Rajaji’s views on Congress’ opposition to support war efforts, the Muslim League’s demand for a separate government, Rajaji’s recommendations to the AICC meeting on 29 April 1942, his subsequent resignation from the Working Committee on the rejection of his proposals, the author concludes that Congress could not assert itself as a spokesman for all. The author states to the effect that the claims that Congress was the only organization that held together the vast spread of India, was disproved.

Comments: The conclusion drawn by the author as above, based on the events leading to resignation of Rajaji, is pathetic to say the least. That the Congress never stifled the voices of dissent is well documented through out its history. The congress politicians those days were of impeccable character. Whenever they felt their views were strong but unacceptable, they resigned without bitterness. From the Congress Party any number of new organizations sprung up owing to differences at various points in time during the Freedom Struggle: Swaraj Party, Forward Block etc. Even Motilal Nehru and later Subash Chandra Bose, why even Gandhi had resigned from the party / party posts( at one time Presidents of the party). They did so, not by coercion but by conviction; and unlike later day politicians they did not bad mouth either the organization  or its incumbents after they left the party. Similarly the Party also did not bad mouth those who left owing to differences in opinion, perceptions and policies. So the resignation of Rajaji owing to differences in the policy of co-operating in the war efforts, can in no way make one conclude that Congress could not assert its position. That it took in its stride such resignations of even their stalwarts and heavy weights only proves that Congress as an organization at that time was too encompassing the nation so as not to be rattled by such dissents.

Compare the way as to how Sikandar Hayat and Saadullah of Assam were forced to resign (Page 298 –299) and the way Fazl-ul Haq reacted to the threat of Jinnah. The author’s silence for not arriving at a similar conclusion about the Muslim League based on the above episodes is jarringly loud.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review page 294

Book Reference: Page 294 Line 12 to 23

Author’s Views: From the book “Ten Years of Freedom” by Kanji Dwarkadas, the author quotes Patel. Patel scathingly questioned, to the effect, as to how could the Congress come to terms with the British Government when they might have to deal with Japanese in six months time. Patel remarked that Cripps was coming at a time when it might be impossible for the British government to give India anything or for India to take anything. The author faults Patel that this was directly contradicting his stance of August 1940 when he openly conveyed that a section of the Congress wanted to arrive at some kind of agreement with the British Government.

Comments: Had not the circumstances changed from 1940 to 1942? Was Japan at the doorsteps of India in 1940? Japan had already over run Burma and the British had withdrawn tactically leaving their Colonies to the mercy of the Japanese. What was the guarantee that the British would not do so if the Japanese over run India too? The British government had made India thoroughly impotent to face any armed aggression. The forces of the Princely states were only ceremonial. They might even pledge their allegiance to Japan  in such a scenario, after all they had no qualms of being subservient to British for the past hundreds of years. The police forces in India did not have adequate firearms even to fight criminals. There was acute scarcity of food and other essential commodities of daily needs. Naturally, if the Japanese came and the British withdrew like they did in Burma, or if they sign a treaty as they did in Munich (the infamous Western Betrayal), what would have been the plight of India? What would have been there for the British to offer and for us to take if that turned out to be the case? In the political field, the leaders have to take stand on the merits of the proposals best suited to the prevailing conditions. So can we still say that Patel changed his stance in 1942 without  compelling reasons?

In page 296 the author concludes that His Majesty’s government did not want a resolution of the problem in India at that time and definitely not when Churchill was the Prime Minister. If that was the conclusion drawn by the author, why he should blame Patel for his change of stance.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 268

Book Reference: Page 268 line 22 -24

Author’s Views: The author , while concluding  the reasons for the British to promote the Muslim League as  their a clear policy,  says to the effect  that it should have been  obvious to the Congress not to have been fooled by such an apparent  British trick. However he qualifies that all of his conclusions are in hindsight.

Comments: When we read the sequence of events as described in pages 266 onwards, the conclusion as to all this being in hindsight is not convincing. Many of the things, for many of the people of those times were pretty obvious , especially so, for seasoned politicians like Gandhi and Jinnah and not in the least the Viceroy. Krishana Menon’s rejoinder from The India Office is proof enough that Congress was aware of the game.

That Jinnah gave a convincing reply in the form of declaring “Deliverance Day” in response to Linlinthgow’s request to rebut the claims of India Office further re-enforced the Congress doubts. Linlithgow’s idea of sending a Muslim delegation also clearely showed  the tacit understanding between the Viceroy and the League to the Congress. It was only the timing, when Jinnah was going to declare openly for the partition of the Country and inform the Viceroy formally the demand for the same, which were not known at that time (ie 1939) to the Congress . (Page 272).

Gandhi and the Congress leaders were clever enough to discern the game the Viceroy was up to. From proportional representation to parity, then on to decrying the Federal Scheme of the government of India Act and then to ask for a separate state of Pakistan, the British government through the Viceroy played their cards well to promote the demands of the League and alienate it from the Congress irrevocably . This was in order to divide the country on communal lines as per their long term strategy to have a buffer state in the west and east. That they used the League was also very clear to Gandhi. That was the reason that Gandhi was always right up to the end  making the plea  "that our problems should be sorted out among ourselves," ( and) not to involve the British to intervene.  The author himself questions (page 273), whether the demand for Pakistan by the League was the constructive proposal, the Viceroy was demanding from them. It was undoubtedly so.

All their (the British) projections as being neutral to all the partys concerned  later on (after the War and preceding independence) were only hogwash.

That the author has omitted to add in this narrative that the Muslim League was a partner in "that obvious British trick" is perhaps the author's trick! 

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 263

Book Reference: Page 263 para 1

Author’s Views: The author in para 1 Page 263, states that the Viceroy was confident of his powers to deal with any campaign of civil disobedience. He also states the Muslim league was neutral in its support to the British war efforts. He surmises that fearing the dangers of Congress and Muslim hostility as they had done during Khilafat movement and also 1857, the Viceroy  was left with the only choice of courting Jinnah and his party.

Comments: The conclusion of the author as above is totally misplaced. The Viceroy had already known the reaction of Jinnah whether he wanted the Congress ministries to be thrown out. (Page 261). He also knew as early as 1938 that if he kept  the Congress at bay he would get un-stinted support from Jinnah (Page 264). He (the Viceroy) also knew that, after examining carefully,  there were no specific instances of repression in the Congress-ruled Provinces (Page 262). He was confident that any civil disobedience campaign by the Congress could be put down. 1857 shadow likely troubling the British crown (Page 263) was utterly improbable since Muslims supporting the Congress was out of the question in view of the understanding reached between the Viceroy and Jinnah as early as August 1938(Page 264). Jinnah was totally opposed to Congress supporting Khilafat movement and decried Gandhi in no uncertain terms (Page 125). Where was the question of them coming together now to threaten the British war efforts? As the author himself quotes (Page 264)  the Viceroy was aware that he could rely on Jinnah’s support as Jinnah had indicated as early as August 1938, of Muslim League’s co-operation with the British.  Jinnah would not therefore come to any agreement with the Congress with respect to the stand to be taken on British war efforts and in asking them to spell out their war aims.  Jinnah, (as quoted by the author from Linlithgow Papers Page 269), promising to give a befitting reply to India League rejoinder further reinforces his stand.

At least Congress was honest enough to oppose the declaration of war and resigned from the ministries on moral grounds though they knew very well that their action would give the Government unfettered powers in pursuing its war effort in addition to indirectly  helping the Muslim league to consolidate its position with their (the Government) help. It is therefore obvious that Jinnah was grateful to Linlithgow for his help. The Viceroy by his masterstroke was able to widen the divide between  the Congress and the League so as to  further consolidate the British power.

 

Where was the question of Hindus and Muslims coming together like they did during Khilafat movement now (1939?) and where is the question of 1857 repeating when the Viceroy was very rightly confident of suppressing any civil disobedience by the Congress. All princely states by now are ruling only in name and real control was with the Residents. The British Indian Army was highly trained and organized. There is was vast improvement in communication, road and rail network to facilitate movement of forces and suppress any upraising. 1939 was not 1857!

Having an assured co-operation from the Muslim League and having obtained such assurances from other major and minor political parties for support and having confidence that the Government was capable of handling any Disobedience Movement by the Congress, the Viceroy felt no necessity to summon an All-Parties Conference, which he planned earlier.

The Viceroy was promoting Jinnah and his party not because he was left with no other choice , but did so to weaken the Congress and prolong the British Rule.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 260 262

Book Reference: Page 260-262

Author’s Views: Detailing on the declaration Of India as a combatant country and an ally by the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on 4 September 1939, the author states protests flared up instantly on this announcement. He later states that neither Gandhi nor any other responsible leader criticized the statement and these criticisms came much later.

The author further states that on 4th September, the Viceroy saw Jinnah and even before that Sikandar Hayat Khan had pledged the support of Punjab and Bengal and publicly affirmed his position irrespective whatever Jinnah and his friends might say.

Quoting from the book “ The Viceroy at Bay- Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943, the Author further narrates that Jinnah bargained for a complete reshaping of the constitution as a means of strengthening his hand and to show some thing positive to his followers. He urged the Viceroy to throw out the Congress ministries. On questioned by the Viceroy how India to obtain self-government if not by democracy, he replied that partition of the country was the escape route. The author further states that late in 1939, the Muslim league did not come out openly to support the Government’s war effort nor did they oppose it (page 263)

Comments: The author first states protests flared up instantly on the declaration by Viceroy. At the same breath, he says neither Gandhi nor any other Congress leader criticized the statement. The term “much later” used by the author is relative. It could be hours, days, weeks or months. Muslim support from Punjab and Bengal was instantaneous. There is no record in the book which shows that either Jinnah or any other League leader protested the declaration. 

Let us now see the other actual position. Gandhi reached Simla on September 5th on the invitation of the Viceroy and issued a statement. Excerpts “I knew I had no authority to speak for any person except myself. I had no instructions whatsoever from the Working Committee ( of the Congress) in the matter…… I had told H.E. as much. I have returned from Viceregal Lodge without any understanding open or secret. If there is to be any, it would be between the Congress and the Government”

The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met on September 10. It gave its support to Great Britain and with a view to make such cooperation effective, the Mahasabha urged the introduction of responsible Government at the Centre, revision of communal award and enlistment of more Hindus in the Army.

The Muslim League came out with its war declaration on September 10. It expressed its great appreciation of Lord Linlithgow inviting Jinnah for consultations. The resolution strongly criticized and condemned the federal scheme, and alleged that the working of the provincial autonomy  resulted in domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minority, whose life and liberty, property and honour were in danger and even their religious rights and culture were being assailed and annihilated everyday. The resolution warned the British Government that it could count on the Muslim support only on two conditions: Muslims must be given justice and fair play in the Congress Provinces and no assurances must be given for constitutional advance nor any constitution framed without the consent and approval of the League “the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.”

The Liberal Federation, All-India Christian Conference and the Indian Princes stood for unconditional assistance to the Government.

While every one else was bargaining for their support to the Government for its war effort, let us now see the statement of the Working Committee of the Congress issued on 14 September:

“ The British Government has declared India as a belligerent country, promulgated ordinances, passed Government of India Act Amending Bill and taken many other far reaching measures …. This has been done without the consent of the Indian people….The Congress has repeatedly declared its entire disapproval of the ideology and practice of fascism and Nazism and their glorification of war and violence and suppression of human spirit…… The issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian People and no outside authority can impose the decision upon them…… India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when that very freedom is denied to her and such limited freedom, as she possesses taken away from her. If war is to defend the status quo, imperialists possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India can have nothing to do with it…..The Congress Working Committee, invite the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged and in particular how these aims are going to apply to India and given effect at present." How much later this has come?10 days after the declaration by the Viceroy. (The Congress took four days for debating the issue in their working Committee for drafting their statement.) 

On not consulting the Constituent assembly, the author quotes Lord Linlithgow asking (page 261) the representatives of the Crown as to what would have been his position had the Congress refused his request.(regarding declaring India at war). The author adds his own comment that perhaps they would have done so. The point is why should the Viceroy or the British Crown needed to worry whether Congress approves or not . After all even if they don’t approve could the decision of the Crown or the Viceroy be set aside or changed! They were the rulers!

Also to note, there arose no need for the Viceroy to turn out the Provincial Governments headed by the Congress, as was required by Jinnah. They all resigned on their own in spite of the fact that the leadership of the Congress Party was fully aware that they would cease to have any voice and they would give unfettered powers to the Viceroy and the Governors. Still they resigned taking a principled stand.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 242

Book Reference: Page 242- 243

Author’s views: The author narrates the episode of Sikandar Hayat Khan pleading for postponement of federation in July 1938 with the Viceroy, and his proposal to dividing India into six or seven regional groups which would include Pakistan as one of them. He also proposed a complicated system of representation so as to prevent Hindu majority in any future legislature. The author avers that the Viceroy had to listen to even such an absurd logic so as not offend the Muslims, as they badly needed them as allies. The British could not afford to have both the communities (Hindu and Muslim) alienated and working against the Raj. The author concludes that the events of 1857 (Sepoy Mutiny) continued to trouble the British psyche for as long as they remained in India.

Comments: Congress was already alienated. The Muslim league was alienated against Congress It was therefore axiomatic that they befriend the Muslims to prolong their rule. The reason was not the shadow of Eighteen Fifty Seven. In 1857 the East India Company had scant support from the British Crown. It could muster only its own Company forces and those of some of the Princely States. By now (1938), the British government was well established, had its own British Indian Army with a vastly improved communication network. It had forces available from nearby colonies as well. By now the British had already fought and won the First World War. It is therefore difficult to digest that the shadow of 1857 would be threatening them even in 1938. They feared more  Gandhi’s non-violent struggle and the international opinion for taking drastic punitive measures. To make the Congress weak, they have to befriend, promote and instigate the Muslim League, in which, they succeeded in no small measure. This is evident from the very next paragraph in the same page. Around the second half of 1938, the author says that Jinnah had suggested to the Acting Viceroy that to keep the Central government, the British should protect the Muslims in the Congress Provinces and that the Muslims, in exchange, would protect the British Raj in Delhi. Was not this tacit understanding the reason for the postponement of the realization of the freedom and also the partition? This is further amplified / clarified by the author himself on the very next page. The author narrates the quotes from “ The Viceroy at Bay –Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943”. After Linlithgow had a long talk with Jinnah, as a record of this conversation to Lord Zetland, Secretary of State wrote to the effect that Jinnah admitted with some reluctance that it looked very much as though that carving up of the country was the position that was going to emerge. ….the only possible course for the Muslims to take in those circumstances was to continue to abuse the British as loudly as possible …. Behind the scenes they might adopt a more co-operative attitude-

In Pages253 to 256, Khaliqizzaman’s meeting with Col. Muirhead and then with Lord Zetland are narrated in detail. The reader may kindly go through the book . Khaliqizzaman brought it to the knowledge of Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India in London in March 1939, what the stand of the Muslim League would be in their next session: “that the British should partition the Muslim areas from the rest of India and proceed with their scheme of federation of Indian Provinces and that the Muslim areas should be independent of the rest. As far as the Princely states they should follow their geographical situation. Jinnah was made aware of the entire conversation by Khaliqizzaman immediately after his arrival in India.

It is amply clear that decision to seek a separate independent state for Muslims was a foregone conclusion for the top leadership of the Muslim League was reiterated as far back as 1939. What is relevant to note is that the League was prepared to leave the Muslims in other Provinces where they were not in majority and those Muslims in the Princely states (who might be geographically separated) to their fate! (Ie. finding themselves the slaves of the majority in the words of Khaliqizzaman). This implies that though they professed to be the one and only agency to speak on behalf of the whole of Muslims in the British India which included the Princely States, they were only concerned about the so called feared slavery of Muslims in Bengal, Punjab, Sind, Assam and North West Frontier Province where Muslims were physically in majority! Even continuation of slavery under British was more acceptable than the feared democracy of free undivided India!

Jaswant Singh's Book Review page 236-238

Book Reference: Page 236 -238

Author’s views: The author while debating "Secularism" concludes that the break down of coalition negotiations contributed to an eventual partition of the country in 1947. In the same breath, he also says that Jinnah came to the conclusion that it was the British who wielded the ultimate power and therefore it was they who could share or transfer any part of that power. Therefore there was no need for him to come to any terms with the Congress.

Comments: Very true. That he was prepared to share power with the British denotes that he was emphatic about transfer of power. His continuation of voicing his opposition to British rule was only an eyewash. (As we will see later in page 243 as the author narrates the record of conversation of the Viceroy with Jinnah and his observations during second half of 1938.)

In Page 238, the author concludes that the Muslims had by that time decided that they should be an effective opposition to the Hindu Congress . Because of the misjudgment and combined effect of the actions and policies of the Congress the chances of a united India becoming independent were receding. (The reader is urged to read the original text in the book to truly appreciate as to what the Author implies)


Comments: One fundamental fact seems to have been overlooked here by the author. In spite of winning the elections the Congress declined even to form the ministries for good three to four months. It was not that the electoral gains had gone to their heads and they would knowingly sow the seeds  either for delaying the realization of Swaraj or for dividing India. Neither Nehru nor other leaders were so foolish to act as implied by the learned author. What he has written above (Page 236) stands nullified if we take this statement  in its facevalue (page 238) and vice versa.

(Why the author should term the Congress of 1939 as Hindu Congress? What was the religious composition of the members of the Congress party of 1939? Were there not members belonging to any other religion apart from Hindus at that time in the Congress Party? Were not many able leaders belonging to other religions and classes including depressed in the Congress at that time? One can understand the leaders of the League terming it as “this Hindu Congress”, but how a learned author and historian of repute like Mr. Jaswant Singh can term it as such is beyond imagination.)



Also it was too early (the year was1939) to arrive at this conclusion. The fact that Pakistan or a buffer state needed to be created for politico strategic reasons on the western side was a long felt necessity for the British Crown, whether India gains dominion status or full freedom at any future date. The NWFP having a Congress majority, though of predominantly Muslim population, was a thorn in their flesh. The fear that at any future date they could join hands with Afghans was also weighing in their heads. A convenient escape route for the British was to assiduously cultivate and prop up the bogey of safeguarding the interest of the minorities and push up the stakes of the Muslim League as a counter balance. This in effect was the actual reason for the partition of India, as we will see later.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 226

Book Reference: Page 226 Line 11-18

Author’s Views: The author quotes that Jinnah in his address at the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League in October 1937 questioned, (a) whether accepting offices by the Congress, when the assurances that were required before offices could be accepted were refused and(b) working the Provincial Constitution enacted by the British Parliament, which was forced upon the people of India by Imperialistic power, were in consonance with the policy and programme and the declaration of the Congress party.

Commenting on the above speech, the author declares that Jinnah’s argument of unity between the Congress and the League was unimpeachable.

The author concludes that, for so long as Congress was in office, as a constitutionalist organization, it occupied the same position like the British authorities and the British Crown.

 

Comments: The fact that Muslim League also contested the election would indicate that, had they become victorious, they would also have taken up the office! The fact was Congress secured an overwhelming victory at the polls and was returned as a majority party in six out of 11 provinces and as the largest single party in all. It is significant to note that out of 1585 seats there were only 657 seats open to general category and still Congress won a total of 715 seats. In the predominantly Muslim Frontier Province Congress candidates won 15 of 36 seats reserved for Muslims while Muslim league could not secure a single seat. In Madras the pro- British Justice Party, which had been in control from 1922 could secure only 21 seats. The Liberal party was wiped out. The Democratic Swaraj Party, which opposed the Congress, also failed. The Hindu Mahasabha failed completely. The Muslim League did better but on the whole its showing was poor especially in the predominantly Muslim provinces –only 4% voted for the league. In Punjab and Sind it failed completely. The Times (of london), who so far castigated Congress as an insignificant minority had to change its opinion and wrote “ The elections have shown that Congress party alone is organized on more than a provincial basis…The party has won its victories on issues which interested millions of Indian rural voters and scores of millions who had no votes”. 

There are a lot of written records regarding the acceptance office by the Congress. An assurance was sought that the Governors will not use their special powers of interference or set aside the advice of the cabinet in regard to the constitutional activities. There was a deadlock due to which the ministries did not take office till July. The deadlock was broken on the Viceroy’s statement implying that “ it is only when the issue between a Governor and his minister constitutes a serious disagreement that any question of the severing of their partnership need arise”.

Regarding the author’s declaration of Jinnah’s stand on Congress League unity, we have to retrace the Chapter 5. The author admits in the opening paragraph (page 207), that top leaders of the League of 1935-36 were mostly comprised of rich and titled persons, landlords and zamindars, nawabs and other self serving favour seekers. The elections were held in 1937 and there were not much changes in the composition of leadership of the League in the intervening period. In page 221, the author, while analyzing, the after effects of the results of the election of 1937, naming some of the leaders, says they did not respond to Jinnah’s call for unity of Muslims but were swayed by personal and class interests. In the very next para (in page 221), the author quotes Dr. Zaidi, to conclude that the leadership of the League went into elections as idealists and emerged as realists!

If Jinnah’s argument of unity between congress and the League was beyond reproach, why he should make an appeal for “Muslim Unity” for the elections. After all idealistic elections are to be fought based on party policies rather than on religious grounds. If that is accepted, how can we call any one an “idealist” if he seeks support based on religious affiliation?


The author certifies firstly, that most of them were self serving favour seekers. Secondly he says some of them were more affiliated to personal gains and self interests. Thirdly he conveys they were idealists to start with, ie before elections and changed as realists after the results of the elections as acutely observed by Dr.Zaidi.

Next regarding “assuming of office”: If assuming office placed them in same constitutional position as the British Crown, why the Muslim League contested the elections in the first place? They should have not only boycotted the elections but also persuaded the Congress to do so. The controversy arose only when the Congress having won a big victory, was not in a mood to allocate portfolios to Muslim MLAs of the League and inducted into the cabinet Muslims who belonged to the Congress party. Had the Congress done otherwise, and acted as per the wishes of the League, what stand Jinnah would have taken? The question of course is hypothetical, but rational in any case. In that case not only the Congress but also the League would have been placed in the same constitutional position as the British Crown. Was that acceptable?


The rhetoric appears more as the story of the grapes turned sour!

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 205

Book Reference: Page 205 Last para

Author’s Views: Quoting Percival Spear from his essay that as per Bolitho, Jinna by championing the cause of Hindu-Muslim Unity in the twenties had greatly damaged his political career. In 1934, when he returned to India , this thought was weighing upon him. The author concludes that it was Congress attitude of totalitarianism rather than the wounded vanity of Jinna which made Jinnah a “communalist.”

Comments: The author in page 220, commenting on the “coalition controversy” and the results of elections of 1937, says that the real tragedy (of the electoral verdicts) was the collapse of Jinnah’s assumptions on which he based his policies for twenty years. His hopes on separate electorates, organising Muslims on a separate political platform, formation of maximum possible Muslim majority provinces, enforcing a weighted representation for them where they were in minority and the like did not result in favourable electoral verdict even in those provinces where Muslims were in the majority . It rather resulted in a disaster as the author quotes.

The point to ponder is, if Jinnah in the previous twenty years has been working on the above policies, where was the question that Congress attitude precipitated his change of approach as claimed by the author. If that was the approach pursued by Jinnah from 1934 onwards, as concluded by the author, where is the further need to project him otherwise in the following years (in subsequent chapters) by the author. The author in page 226, recalling his address at 25th session in October 1937,says that Jinnah’s central argument of unity between Congress and the Muslim League was beyond reproach. Now, one has to distinguish between Hindu-Muslim unity and the unity between Congress and the Muslim League. If the leadership of the League has been assiduously promoting separateness of the people ( “the famous Fourteen Points”) and the Congress was stoutly opposing most of it , how can the author claim that he was the champion for promoting unity of the Congress and the League. After all the parties are made up of people.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 194

Book Reference: Page 194 Line 13-14

Author’s Views: The author after describing the stand taken by various delegates of the Second Round Table conference concludes their hair splitting arguments were sad, ironic and tragic. ( The reader is urged to go through the book as I can not quote the text verbatim due to copyright constraints)

Comments: It would be better to follow the proceedings of the conference in toto before arriving at any conclusion/ comment on the wisdom of the people who attended the conference irrespective they belonged to Congress or Minorities or Depressed Classes (who all indulged in the so called circular hair splitting). The author while narrating events as told by Aga Khan , Begam Shaw Nawaz etc conveniently by passes the actual proceedings of the Conference. A brief on the same is given below.

The work of the RTC was done by two Committees namely, the Federal Structure Committee and the Minorities Committee. Gandhi was a member of both. He demanded control by the Federal Legislature of the Army and Foreign Affairs. He objected to the provisions suggested in regard to commercial discrimination and to the proposed financial safeguards. He wanted that, before they were taken over by a National Government, financial obligations of the Government of India would have to be scrutinized. What was the contribution/ stand of other Indian members to the Federal Structure Committee on these issues? None, as they had no clue as to what Gandhi was driving at. A scrutiny or financial audit of the Government would have put extensive financial obligations on His Majesty’s Government.

Gandhi took part in the negotiations with persistence in the proceedings of the Minorities committee. Dr. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for Depressed Classes and he was supported by other minorities barring Sikhs. Dr.Ambedkar declared “ the Depressed classes are not anxious, they are not clamorous, they have not started any movement for claiming that there shall be immediate transfer of power from the British to the Indian people”. Muslim and Sikh speakers made it clear that they could not commit themselves to the federal scheme until the communal issue has been solved. Aga Khan presented a memorandum to the Prime Minister demanding, in addition to the maintenance of the statutory rights, special representation through communal electorates and a declaration of civil rights. Gandhi was agreeable if the Prime Minister gives his decision only in so far as it related to Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. He would press congress to accept MacDonald’s award. Aga Khan, Shoukat Ali, Jinnah, Shafi and Iqbal, declared that they would not be a party to any document unless it included all minorities. (Why? Because they wanted to scuttle any decision being arrived at).

When Mcdonald during his speech on November 13, included the Depressed Classes demand for separate electorates in the Minorities pact, Gandhi was determined to oppose it. He declared that the different communities were encouraged to press, with all the vehemence at their command, their own respective views, and pointed out that this question was not the main fulcrum, but the central fact was Constitution Building. He pertinently asked whether the delegates were brought here 6000 miles from India to settle the communal question? He was very vehement that he did not want “on our register and on our census untouchables, classified as a separate class”. This was his principled stand and it was no circular hair splitting. He, very rightly felt that the Communal Question / Minority Issues are internal and not to be resolved by an outsider (ie. The British). It is surprising how the author omitted the stand taken by the representative of Depressed Classes and Gandhi’s stand during the Conference.

 

It is also worth the while to recapitulate what Gandhi spoke during the Plenary Session on November 28 (almost at midnight.) “ I do not think anything I can say this evening can possibly influence the decision of the cabinet. Probably the decision has already been taken. Matters of liberty of practically a whole continent can hardly be decided by mere argumentation.” He reemphasized that the communal problem might be solved if the wedge of the foreign rule was withdrawn, driving the point that it would be better to solve the problem in-house rather asking a third party to mediate.

The wedge of the foreign rule was the root cause of the communal problem, which Gandhi correctly diagnosed where as all others were asking the perpetrators of the problem to solve the same! Yes this is what is ironic.

The outcome of the Second Round Table Conference may be sad and tragic but definitely not ironical.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 192

Book Reference: Page 192 Line 3-9

Author’s Views: The author quotes Agha Khan from part of his personal memoirs (on the Second RTC) as having said that the Congress attitude seemed unrealistic. The Congress held stubbornly to their one-nation theory, which they ( Agha Khan and his likes)  knew to be historically insupportable. They maintained that before the coming of British Raj the various regions of the Indian Subcontinent had never been one country. It was the Raj which created an artificial and temporary unity, and when the Raj went, that unity could not be maintained. The author qualifies that though these were subjective opinion of Agha Khan, he wants to  convey them as they intensely portray the feeling in those times in general and certainly the feel in the Conference and of the Conferees( of the RTC).

Comments: Though the views were of Agha Khan, the emphasis comes from the author and he has not offered any other proof on these views in his book. As the author is emphatic about the feel of the Conferees, does he mean that the feeling was felt by every single Indian and British Member  taking part in the Conference. How is the author so sure  that was certainly the feeling in the Conference itself? How can the demand of  the Muslim League  and its supporters become the feel of the entire Conferees as the author puts it?  Did all the members, other than those of  Muslim League and its sympathisers,  also display the above feel?  Where is the narrative to substantiate his conclusion?

Secondly why India as one nation is historically un-supportable? What was India during the time of Mouryas and Guptas and much later even during the height of Mughal empire? Is the so-called transient unity was the creation of Raj or of Mahatma Gandhi?
Was the transient unity  restricted to only the British Provinces or did include the so called Princely States also? 

Is not India post partition standing united against external aggressions and internal political turmoil? Has it not proved to the world that it continues to follow the path of democracy?

Agha Khan's observation only proves that irrespective of the stand held by the Congress and other parties and in spite of any compromise getting reached, the mind set of the Muslim League was such that India could not remain as one nation.  The seeds for that was sown at the Muslim Conference of 1st January 1929 and later accepted by Muslim League in toto. ( They began to be called "Jinnah's fourteen points".) If that was the mind set nurtured as far back as 1929/1930, where is the argument for blaming any one else for the partition of 1947 in the later years?

It was not Congress attitude during the RTC , but to a large extent Gandhi’s imposition on the Congress to “ let us sort out the problems between us ourselves rather asking a third party (the British) to mediate”,  the fundamental condition of his that was unnerving Agha Khan and his likes.
The reader may  refer to future posts which deal with other aspects of the RTC.