Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 341-353

Book Reference: Page 341 – 353 Simla Conference of June 1945

Author’s Views: Page 341:  It came to light later that Jinnah had expressed it as a grievance Gandhi’s withdrawal from the conference.

Comments: Compare (from page 313) when Gandhi, after obtaining Jinnah’s concurrence, went to meet him in Bombay on 9 September 1944 at his residence. At the very beginning Jinnah questioned the representative capacity of Gandhi. Where is the grievance now (in 1945) for Jinnah for Gandhi’s non-participation in the Simla Conference, when Gandhi’s status has not changed politically? As the author narrates from the interview of Gandhi with Preston Grover, Gandhi had said that if Jinnah had wanted, he could take him there? Did that happen? Is there any record to show that Jinnah wrote / spoke to Gandhi to change his stand and attend the Conference? What is the point in projecting the so-called grievance? 

Page 343: The author narrates that the Viceroy asked all the delegates representing varied interests to hand over a list of persons they would like to be included in the national government. Jinnah posed a lot of conditions. When the Viceroy asked him (Jinnah) whether the League would submit the list of names or not, Jinnah answered that he was there only in his individual capacity. He wanted the Viceroy’s proposal in writing to place before the Working Committee of the League.

Comments: All along Jinnah had been proclaiming that he was the undisputed and sole spokesman for the League. Here he says he has come on his individual capacity. Nevertheless, in his reply to Viceroy, he goes back to what happened during Lord Linlithgow’s time (page 344). Linlithgow’s alternative proposal accepted that the panel of names from the Muslim League would be based on the discussion of the Leader of the party and Viceroy and not on the formal panel of names submitted by the party! He concludes his letter regretting his inability (to forward the names), as desired by the Executive Committee of the League, as the Viceroy could not give the assurance that all the Muslim Members of the proposed Executive Council will be selected from the Muslim League only. The points to ponder are:

1. The Viceroy had clarified during his face-to-face talk that he can give no such assurance.


2. Jinnah quotes Linlithgow’s acceptance that the list will be based what the Viceroy and the leader of the Party (himself) decide and not what the party sends formally. (The leader of the party wields more authority than the Committee)

3. He regrets his inability to send the list of names as desired by the Executive Committee of the League. (Here the Committee wields more authority)

Now the reader can come to his own conclusion as to who was responsible for the failure of Simla Conference, even though the Viceroy was gracious enough to apportion the blame on himself

Page 346: Jinnah, who earlier proclaimed that the Muslim League was the champion and protector of all minorities and the Congress did not even represent all Hindus, says in a statement that the representatives of all minorities have the same goal as and ideology of a united India as that of Congress and they are knitted closely to Hindu society. The root cause of the failure was doubtless Jinnah’s intransigence about Muslim representation and equality of the Muslim vote with all others combined.


Comments: Elsewhere in many places in the book the author has blamed Congress and its leaders for delaying the attainment of colonial status, freedom, forming of provisional government etc. How Jinnah played the minorities card is amply explained by the author himself in this page. Jinnah’s demand that League alone would nominate any Muslim member to the Council, in spite of the fact that in only Assam and Sindh had League ministries proves another fact that Jinnah had made up his mind for the partition of India as the price for freedom for the subcontinent. If it has to be delayed indefinitely it mattered nothing to him. The analysis of Dr. Jayakar is very apt. (Page 346)

Page 352: On the announcement of fresh elections in late 1945, the author states that the Congress lost another opportunity by its President not meeting or writing to the Viceroy their wish to return to the office in the provinces from where they were dismissed. The author further concludes that the Viceroy would not have found it easy to refuse; rather he would have welcomed it.


Comments: Yes! If they were today’s politicians they would have even begged the Viceroy . But the principles exhibited by the Congress Party of those days precluded any such effort by its leadership. Also what would have the League done. They would have decried the Congress as hankering after power and with a supportive press in England brought the image of the Congress down. How the author has come to the conclusion that the Viceroy would have welcomed such a request has not been substantiated.

(However, what the results of the elections demonstrated, is vividly described by the author in pages 354 and 355. In a nutshell, their failure added further resolve for the League’s demand for Pakistan as they found to their dismay, in a democratic undivided India, they will find themselves only in opposition irrespective of reservations)

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 302

Book Reference: Page 302-305

Author’s Views: Elaborating on the Viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow, the author in page 305 says, that though the British encouraged the demand for Pakistan, by the League, they did not identify themselves with it. (The reader will have a first hand knowledge from the above pages of the book, how Linlithgow did everything in his power and beyond it, to widen the chasm between the Political parties in general and between the Congress and the League in particular)

Comments: The author concedes the role played by the British through the actions of the Viceroy. That they did not identify themselves with the league’s demand of Pakistan is questionable. As we have seen earlier, the demand of the League was a welcome cloak. For once, they were very sure of Nehru’s ascendancy in the free India (and his socialistic leanings) who would not toe the lines of the West blindly. Secondly they would need a buffer state in the west oriented to Western ideology, weak and having dependence on the West. Even before the Note of Field Marshal Auchinleck of 1946, (See Appendix XI to chapter 8 page 557) the requirement of creating a buffer state inimical to the interest of free India and owing allegiance to the Crown in future, in the North West of the subcontinent as a strategic necessity, was recognized by the British. Jinnah’s demand, strengthened by the Viceroy’s partiality and patent support of the League’s demands came very handy to alienate Congress further and make them accept the Partition as inevitable. (See also author’s remarks in page 305 last five lines.)

Writing on the Gandhi –Jinnah talks of September 1911, the author states that (page 319) Gandhi then wanted an answer from Jinnah as to how the independent states as propounded by him wold be benefited by the split and would they not become a menace to themselves and to the rest of India. Jinnah replied to the effect that it was the only solution of the Indian problem and the price India (ie the rest of India) must pay for its independence.

Comments: After reading the narration of the author, is it not obvious that Jinnah would have opposed tooth and nail the freedom of the subcontinent and the departure of British unless and until his demand for Pakistan was not first met? No doubt that Jinnah is the architect and creator of Pakistan and rightly called as such, but the freedom for India had come only because it had to pay the price as quoted by Jinnah. Why then blame Nehru, Patel or Gandhi or the Congress or even the British. Gandhi’s later inter locution also becomes irrelevant (Pages 322-325) for discussion.

The author in his concluding paragraph of Chapter 6 (Page 330) says that what was sought by the Muslims was just a convincing enough space to safe guard against majoritarianism (what ever it may mean) and enable them to arbitrate their own social, religious and political destinies and a reassuring system, “ ideally (still) in India, but outside, if inevitable.”

How, after himself narrating the back ground for the demand of Pakistan in the preceding pages, the author arrives at the above conclusion that “they still believed it to be ideal to be with in India”, is beyond comprehension. The ‘inevitable’ has been already spelt out by Jinnah, as the price India has to pay for freedom. In page 322 last para commenting on the answer given by Jinnah to a question of Gandhi, the author states that Jinnah wanted the envisaged Pakistan areas would be hostile to the rest of India or would even make war upon her if there was no joint concern. So much for the attitude, the author is craving about in page 330 and for his shedding copious tears for the human tragedy and the hasty vivisection of India entailed (page 331). As Jinnah had aptly put it that was the “price you have to pay if you want freedom from the British.” Are we not still paying the price, even six decades after independence?

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 297

Book Reference: Page 297 -298

Author’s Views: Narrating Rajaji’s views on Congress’ opposition to support war efforts, the Muslim League’s demand for a separate government, Rajaji’s recommendations to the AICC meeting on 29 April 1942, his subsequent resignation from the Working Committee on the rejection of his proposals, the author concludes that Congress could not assert itself as a spokesman for all. The author states to the effect that the claims that Congress was the only organization that held together the vast spread of India, was disproved.

Comments: The conclusion drawn by the author as above, based on the events leading to resignation of Rajaji, is pathetic to say the least. That the Congress never stifled the voices of dissent is well documented through out its history. The congress politicians those days were of impeccable character. Whenever they felt their views were strong but unacceptable, they resigned without bitterness. From the Congress Party any number of new organizations sprung up owing to differences at various points in time during the Freedom Struggle: Swaraj Party, Forward Block etc. Even Motilal Nehru and later Subash Chandra Bose, why even Gandhi had resigned from the party / party posts( at one time Presidents of the party). They did so, not by coercion but by conviction; and unlike later day politicians they did not bad mouth either the organization  or its incumbents after they left the party. Similarly the Party also did not bad mouth those who left owing to differences in opinion, perceptions and policies. So the resignation of Rajaji owing to differences in the policy of co-operating in the war efforts, can in no way make one conclude that Congress could not assert its position. That it took in its stride such resignations of even their stalwarts and heavy weights only proves that Congress as an organization at that time was too encompassing the nation so as not to be rattled by such dissents.

Compare the way as to how Sikandar Hayat and Saadullah of Assam were forced to resign (Page 298 –299) and the way Fazl-ul Haq reacted to the threat of Jinnah. The author’s silence for not arriving at a similar conclusion about the Muslim League based on the above episodes is jarringly loud.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review page 294

Book Reference: Page 294 Line 12 to 23

Author’s Views: From the book “Ten Years of Freedom” by Kanji Dwarkadas, the author quotes Patel. Patel scathingly questioned, to the effect, as to how could the Congress come to terms with the British Government when they might have to deal with Japanese in six months time. Patel remarked that Cripps was coming at a time when it might be impossible for the British government to give India anything or for India to take anything. The author faults Patel that this was directly contradicting his stance of August 1940 when he openly conveyed that a section of the Congress wanted to arrive at some kind of agreement with the British Government.

Comments: Had not the circumstances changed from 1940 to 1942? Was Japan at the doorsteps of India in 1940? Japan had already over run Burma and the British had withdrawn tactically leaving their Colonies to the mercy of the Japanese. What was the guarantee that the British would not do so if the Japanese over run India too? The British government had made India thoroughly impotent to face any armed aggression. The forces of the Princely states were only ceremonial. They might even pledge their allegiance to Japan  in such a scenario, after all they had no qualms of being subservient to British for the past hundreds of years. The police forces in India did not have adequate firearms even to fight criminals. There was acute scarcity of food and other essential commodities of daily needs. Naturally, if the Japanese came and the British withdrew like they did in Burma, or if they sign a treaty as they did in Munich (the infamous Western Betrayal), what would have been the plight of India? What would have been there for the British to offer and for us to take if that turned out to be the case? In the political field, the leaders have to take stand on the merits of the proposals best suited to the prevailing conditions. So can we still say that Patel changed his stance in 1942 without  compelling reasons?

In page 296 the author concludes that His Majesty’s government did not want a resolution of the problem in India at that time and definitely not when Churchill was the Prime Minister. If that was the conclusion drawn by the author, why he should blame Patel for his change of stance.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 268

Book Reference: Page 268 line 22 -24

Author’s Views: The author , while concluding  the reasons for the British to promote the Muslim League as  their a clear policy,  says to the effect  that it should have been  obvious to the Congress not to have been fooled by such an apparent  British trick. However he qualifies that all of his conclusions are in hindsight.

Comments: When we read the sequence of events as described in pages 266 onwards, the conclusion as to all this being in hindsight is not convincing. Many of the things, for many of the people of those times were pretty obvious , especially so, for seasoned politicians like Gandhi and Jinnah and not in the least the Viceroy. Krishana Menon’s rejoinder from The India Office is proof enough that Congress was aware of the game.

That Jinnah gave a convincing reply in the form of declaring “Deliverance Day” in response to Linlinthgow’s request to rebut the claims of India Office further re-enforced the Congress doubts. Linlithgow’s idea of sending a Muslim delegation also clearely showed  the tacit understanding between the Viceroy and the League to the Congress. It was only the timing, when Jinnah was going to declare openly for the partition of the Country and inform the Viceroy formally the demand for the same, which were not known at that time (ie 1939) to the Congress . (Page 272).

Gandhi and the Congress leaders were clever enough to discern the game the Viceroy was up to. From proportional representation to parity, then on to decrying the Federal Scheme of the government of India Act and then to ask for a separate state of Pakistan, the British government through the Viceroy played their cards well to promote the demands of the League and alienate it from the Congress irrevocably . This was in order to divide the country on communal lines as per their long term strategy to have a buffer state in the west and east. That they used the League was also very clear to Gandhi. That was the reason that Gandhi was always right up to the end  making the plea  "that our problems should be sorted out among ourselves," ( and) not to involve the British to intervene.  The author himself questions (page 273), whether the demand for Pakistan by the League was the constructive proposal, the Viceroy was demanding from them. It was undoubtedly so.

All their (the British) projections as being neutral to all the partys concerned  later on (after the War and preceding independence) were only hogwash.

That the author has omitted to add in this narrative that the Muslim League was a partner in "that obvious British trick" is perhaps the author's trick! 

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 263

Book Reference: Page 263 para 1

Author’s Views: The author in para 1 Page 263, states that the Viceroy was confident of his powers to deal with any campaign of civil disobedience. He also states the Muslim league was neutral in its support to the British war efforts. He surmises that fearing the dangers of Congress and Muslim hostility as they had done during Khilafat movement and also 1857, the Viceroy  was left with the only choice of courting Jinnah and his party.

Comments: The conclusion of the author as above is totally misplaced. The Viceroy had already known the reaction of Jinnah whether he wanted the Congress ministries to be thrown out. (Page 261). He also knew as early as 1938 that if he kept  the Congress at bay he would get un-stinted support from Jinnah (Page 264). He (the Viceroy) also knew that, after examining carefully,  there were no specific instances of repression in the Congress-ruled Provinces (Page 262). He was confident that any civil disobedience campaign by the Congress could be put down. 1857 shadow likely troubling the British crown (Page 263) was utterly improbable since Muslims supporting the Congress was out of the question in view of the understanding reached between the Viceroy and Jinnah as early as August 1938(Page 264). Jinnah was totally opposed to Congress supporting Khilafat movement and decried Gandhi in no uncertain terms (Page 125). Where was the question of them coming together now to threaten the British war efforts? As the author himself quotes (Page 264)  the Viceroy was aware that he could rely on Jinnah’s support as Jinnah had indicated as early as August 1938, of Muslim League’s co-operation with the British.  Jinnah would not therefore come to any agreement with the Congress with respect to the stand to be taken on British war efforts and in asking them to spell out their war aims.  Jinnah, (as quoted by the author from Linlithgow Papers Page 269), promising to give a befitting reply to India League rejoinder further reinforces his stand.

At least Congress was honest enough to oppose the declaration of war and resigned from the ministries on moral grounds though they knew very well that their action would give the Government unfettered powers in pursuing its war effort in addition to indirectly  helping the Muslim league to consolidate its position with their (the Government) help. It is therefore obvious that Jinnah was grateful to Linlithgow for his help. The Viceroy by his masterstroke was able to widen the divide between  the Congress and the League so as to  further consolidate the British power.

 

Where was the question of Hindus and Muslims coming together like they did during Khilafat movement now (1939?) and where is the question of 1857 repeating when the Viceroy was very rightly confident of suppressing any civil disobedience by the Congress. All princely states by now are ruling only in name and real control was with the Residents. The British Indian Army was highly trained and organized. There is was vast improvement in communication, road and rail network to facilitate movement of forces and suppress any upraising. 1939 was not 1857!

Having an assured co-operation from the Muslim League and having obtained such assurances from other major and minor political parties for support and having confidence that the Government was capable of handling any Disobedience Movement by the Congress, the Viceroy felt no necessity to summon an All-Parties Conference, which he planned earlier.

The Viceroy was promoting Jinnah and his party not because he was left with no other choice , but did so to weaken the Congress and prolong the British Rule.

Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 260 262

Book Reference: Page 260-262

Author’s Views: Detailing on the declaration Of India as a combatant country and an ally by the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on 4 September 1939, the author states protests flared up instantly on this announcement. He later states that neither Gandhi nor any other responsible leader criticized the statement and these criticisms came much later.

The author further states that on 4th September, the Viceroy saw Jinnah and even before that Sikandar Hayat Khan had pledged the support of Punjab and Bengal and publicly affirmed his position irrespective whatever Jinnah and his friends might say.

Quoting from the book “ The Viceroy at Bay- Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943, the Author further narrates that Jinnah bargained for a complete reshaping of the constitution as a means of strengthening his hand and to show some thing positive to his followers. He urged the Viceroy to throw out the Congress ministries. On questioned by the Viceroy how India to obtain self-government if not by democracy, he replied that partition of the country was the escape route. The author further states that late in 1939, the Muslim league did not come out openly to support the Government’s war effort nor did they oppose it (page 263)

Comments: The author first states protests flared up instantly on the declaration by Viceroy. At the same breath, he says neither Gandhi nor any other Congress leader criticized the statement. The term “much later” used by the author is relative. It could be hours, days, weeks or months. Muslim support from Punjab and Bengal was instantaneous. There is no record in the book which shows that either Jinnah or any other League leader protested the declaration. 

Let us now see the other actual position. Gandhi reached Simla on September 5th on the invitation of the Viceroy and issued a statement. Excerpts “I knew I had no authority to speak for any person except myself. I had no instructions whatsoever from the Working Committee ( of the Congress) in the matter…… I had told H.E. as much. I have returned from Viceregal Lodge without any understanding open or secret. If there is to be any, it would be between the Congress and the Government”

The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met on September 10. It gave its support to Great Britain and with a view to make such cooperation effective, the Mahasabha urged the introduction of responsible Government at the Centre, revision of communal award and enlistment of more Hindus in the Army.

The Muslim League came out with its war declaration on September 10. It expressed its great appreciation of Lord Linlithgow inviting Jinnah for consultations. The resolution strongly criticized and condemned the federal scheme, and alleged that the working of the provincial autonomy  resulted in domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minority, whose life and liberty, property and honour were in danger and even their religious rights and culture were being assailed and annihilated everyday. The resolution warned the British Government that it could count on the Muslim support only on two conditions: Muslims must be given justice and fair play in the Congress Provinces and no assurances must be given for constitutional advance nor any constitution framed without the consent and approval of the League “the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.”

The Liberal Federation, All-India Christian Conference and the Indian Princes stood for unconditional assistance to the Government.

While every one else was bargaining for their support to the Government for its war effort, let us now see the statement of the Working Committee of the Congress issued on 14 September:

“ The British Government has declared India as a belligerent country, promulgated ordinances, passed Government of India Act Amending Bill and taken many other far reaching measures …. This has been done without the consent of the Indian people….The Congress has repeatedly declared its entire disapproval of the ideology and practice of fascism and Nazism and their glorification of war and violence and suppression of human spirit…… The issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian People and no outside authority can impose the decision upon them…… India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when that very freedom is denied to her and such limited freedom, as she possesses taken away from her. If war is to defend the status quo, imperialists possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India can have nothing to do with it…..The Congress Working Committee, invite the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged and in particular how these aims are going to apply to India and given effect at present." How much later this has come?10 days after the declaration by the Viceroy. (The Congress took four days for debating the issue in their working Committee for drafting their statement.) 

On not consulting the Constituent assembly, the author quotes Lord Linlithgow asking (page 261) the representatives of the Crown as to what would have been his position had the Congress refused his request.(regarding declaring India at war). The author adds his own comment that perhaps they would have done so. The point is why should the Viceroy or the British Crown needed to worry whether Congress approves or not . After all even if they don’t approve could the decision of the Crown or the Viceroy be set aside or changed! They were the rulers!

Also to note, there arose no need for the Viceroy to turn out the Provincial Governments headed by the Congress, as was required by Jinnah. They all resigned on their own in spite of the fact that the leadership of the Congress Party was fully aware that they would cease to have any voice and they would give unfettered powers to the Viceroy and the Governors. Still they resigned taking a principled stand.