Author’s Views: Elaborating on the Viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow, the author in page 305 says, that though the British encouraged the demand for Pakistan, by the League, they did not identify themselves with it. (The reader will have a first hand knowledge from the above pages of the book, how Linlithgow did everything in his power and beyond it, to widen the chasm between the Political parties in general and between the Congress and the League in particular)
Comments: The author concedes the role played by the British through the actions of the Viceroy. That they did not identify themselves with the league’s demand of Pakistan is questionable. As we have seen earlier, the demand of the League was a welcome cloak. For once, they were very sure of Nehru’s ascendancy in the free India (and his socialistic leanings) who would not toe the lines of the West blindly. Secondly they would need a buffer state in the west oriented to Western ideology, weak and having dependence on the West. Even before the Note of Field Marshal Auchinleck of 1946, (See Appendix XI to chapter 8 page 557) the requirement of creating a buffer state inimical to the interest of free India and owing allegiance to the Crown in future, in the North West of the subcontinent as a strategic necessity, was recognized by the British. Jinnah’s demand, strengthened by the Viceroy’s partiality and patent support of the League’s demands came very handy to alienate Congress further and make them accept the Partition as inevitable. (See also author’s remarks in page 305 last five lines.)
Writing on the Gandhi –Jinnah talks of September 1911, the author states that (page 319) Gandhi then wanted an answer from Jinnah as to how the independent states as propounded by him wold be benefited by the split and would they not become a menace to themselves and to the rest of India. Jinnah replied to the effect that it was the only solution of the Indian problem and the price India (ie the rest of India) must pay for its independence.
Comments: After reading the narration of the author, is it not obvious that Jinnah would have opposed tooth and nail the freedom of the subcontinent and the departure of British unless and until his demand for Pakistan was not first met? No doubt that Jinnah is the architect and creator of Pakistan and rightly called as such, but the freedom for India had come only because it had to pay the price as quoted by Jinnah. Why then blame Nehru, Patel or Gandhi or the Congress or even the British. Gandhi’s later inter locution also becomes irrelevant (Pages 322-325) for discussion.
The author in his concluding paragraph of Chapter 6 (Page 330) says that what was sought by the Muslims was just a convincing enough space to safe guard against majoritarianism (what ever it may mean) and enable them to arbitrate their own social, religious and political destinies and a reassuring system, “ ideally (still) in India, but outside, if inevitable.”
How, after himself narrating the back ground for the demand of Pakistan in the preceding pages, the author arrives at the above conclusion that “they still believed it to be ideal to be with in India”, is beyond comprehension. The ‘inevitable’ has been already spelt out by Jinnah, as the price India has to pay for freedom. In page 322 last para commenting on the answer given by Jinnah to a question of Gandhi, the author states that Jinnah wanted the envisaged Pakistan areas would be hostile to the rest of India or would even make war upon her if there was no joint concern. So much for the attitude, the author is craving about in page 330 and for his shedding copious tears for the human tragedy and the hasty vivisection of India entailed (page 331). As Jinnah had aptly put it that was the “price you have to pay if you want freedom from the British.” Are we not still paying the price, even six decades after independence?
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