Author’s Views: The author in para 1 Page 263, states that the Viceroy was confident of his powers to deal with any campaign of civil disobedience. He also states the Muslim league was neutral in its support to the British war efforts. He surmises that fearing the dangers of Congress and Muslim hostility as they had done during Khilafat movement and also 1857, the Viceroy was left with the only choice of courting Jinnah and his party.
Comments: The conclusion of the author as above is totally misplaced. The Viceroy had already known the reaction of Jinnah whether he wanted the Congress ministries to be thrown out. (Page 261). He also knew as early as 1938 that if he kept the Congress at bay he would get un-stinted support from Jinnah (Page 264). He (the Viceroy) also knew that, after examining carefully, there were no specific instances of repression in the Congress-ruled Provinces (Page 262). He was confident that any civil disobedience campaign by the Congress could be put down. 1857 shadow likely troubling the British crown (Page 263) was utterly improbable since Muslims supporting the Congress was out of the question in view of the understanding reached between the Viceroy and Jinnah as early as August 1938(Page 264). Jinnah was totally opposed to Congress supporting Khilafat movement and decried Gandhi in no uncertain terms (Page 125). Where was the question of them coming together now to threaten the British war efforts? As the author himself quotes (Page 264) the Viceroy was aware that he could rely on Jinnah’s support as Jinnah had indicated as early as August 1938, of Muslim League’s co-operation with the British. Jinnah would not therefore come to any agreement with the Congress with respect to the stand to be taken on British war efforts and in asking them to spell out their war aims. Jinnah, (as quoted by the author from Linlithgow Papers Page 269), promising to give a befitting reply to India League rejoinder further reinforces his stand.
At least Congress was honest enough to oppose the declaration of war and resigned from the ministries on moral grounds though they knew very well that their action would give the Government unfettered powers in pursuing its war effort in addition to indirectly helping the Muslim league to consolidate its position with their (the Government) help. It is therefore obvious that Jinnah was grateful to Linlithgow for his help. The Viceroy by his masterstroke was able to widen the divide between the Congress and the League so as to further consolidate the British power.
Where was the question of Hindus and Muslims coming together like they did during Khilafat movement now (1939?) and where is the question of 1857 repeating when the Viceroy was very rightly confident of suppressing any civil disobedience by the Congress. All princely states by now are ruling only in name and real control was with the Residents. The British Indian Army was highly trained and organized. There is was vast improvement in communication, road and rail network to facilitate movement of forces and suppress any upraising. 1939 was not 1857!
Having an assured co-operation from the Muslim League and having obtained such assurances from other major and minor political parties for support and having confidence that the Government was capable of handling any Disobedience Movement by the Congress, the Viceroy felt no necessity to summon an All-Parties Conference, which he planned earlier.
The Viceroy was promoting Jinnah and his party not because he was left with no other choice , but did so to weaken the Congress and prolong the British Rule.
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