Jaswant Singh's Book Review Page 268

Book Reference: Page 268 line 22 -24

Author’s Views: The author , while concluding  the reasons for the British to promote the Muslim League as  their a clear policy,  says to the effect  that it should have been  obvious to the Congress not to have been fooled by such an apparent  British trick. However he qualifies that all of his conclusions are in hindsight.

Comments: When we read the sequence of events as described in pages 266 onwards, the conclusion as to all this being in hindsight is not convincing. Many of the things, for many of the people of those times were pretty obvious , especially so, for seasoned politicians like Gandhi and Jinnah and not in the least the Viceroy. Krishana Menon’s rejoinder from The India Office is proof enough that Congress was aware of the game.

That Jinnah gave a convincing reply in the form of declaring “Deliverance Day” in response to Linlinthgow’s request to rebut the claims of India Office further re-enforced the Congress doubts. Linlithgow’s idea of sending a Muslim delegation also clearely showed  the tacit understanding between the Viceroy and the League to the Congress. It was only the timing, when Jinnah was going to declare openly for the partition of the Country and inform the Viceroy formally the demand for the same, which were not known at that time (ie 1939) to the Congress . (Page 272).

Gandhi and the Congress leaders were clever enough to discern the game the Viceroy was up to. From proportional representation to parity, then on to decrying the Federal Scheme of the government of India Act and then to ask for a separate state of Pakistan, the British government through the Viceroy played their cards well to promote the demands of the League and alienate it from the Congress irrevocably . This was in order to divide the country on communal lines as per their long term strategy to have a buffer state in the west and east. That they used the League was also very clear to Gandhi. That was the reason that Gandhi was always right up to the end  making the plea  "that our problems should be sorted out among ourselves," ( and) not to involve the British to intervene.  The author himself questions (page 273), whether the demand for Pakistan by the League was the constructive proposal, the Viceroy was demanding from them. It was undoubtedly so.

All their (the British) projections as being neutral to all the partys concerned  later on (after the War and preceding independence) were only hogwash.

That the author has omitted to add in this narrative that the Muslim League was a partner in "that obvious British trick" is perhaps the author's trick!